

Khan, would not allow "the ECO countries and the rest of the region to develop in the way we aspire to."


Najibullah has shown no signs that he is willing to step down. He told *Asiaweek*: "If the opposition put aside their weapons and sit down with me and other Afghans around the negotiating table, the future leadership of the state can be worked out by means of an intra-Afghan dialogue and then free elections — a secret, direct, equal general ballot under the supervision of the U.N." Najibullah has also been cosying up to Zahir Shah, who now lives in Rome. Kabul has stepped up efforts to convince the king to return home and maybe even preside over an interim government. Last month Najibullah restored all royal properties confiscated in the 1970s.

Minister of State for Finance Sardar Assef Ali, who headed a Pakistani delegation to the republics this year, says Central Asians are worried about fundamentalism taking hold in Afghanistan. They regard Najibullah as a "modern man who is a democrat, and they think Pakistan and the mujahideen are the culprits in promoting fundamentalism," he says. Kabul, meanwhile, has been devoting considerable attention to maintaining a good image in Central Asia. When a small group of armed Afghans crossed into Tajikistan in January and robbed a collective farm, Najibullah was quick to condemn the incident and attribute it to mujahideen "extremists." Kabul's Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil visited Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan early this year.

While seeking to show the outside world he is in control, the Afghan president has been shoring up support in Kabul. His first priority has been to bring to heel the hardline Khalq faction of the ruling Watan party. Many Khalq members resent the regime's back-tracking on socialist policies. But purges have largely defanged the threat. There have been rumblings within Najibullah's own Paroham wing of the Watan. In December he moved swiftly to head off a threat from generals sympathetic to former Communist Party boss Babrak Karmal. Tipped off by his security apparatus, Najibullah reportedly summoned the generals for a blistering dressing-down and scotched any coup plans.

**W**hile not completely out of the picture, New Delhi stands apart as it observes the possible growth of an alliance of Islamic states. "We will have to live with an Afghanistan that draws closer to Pakistan," says an official of

India's foreign ministry. Peace in Afghanistan would have an effect on the situation in Kashmir. Many Kashmiri militants on both sides of the border get their arms from the Afghan mujahideen.



#### INITIATIVES

### 'The Iranians Are Coming Out'



On the Feb. 11 anniversary of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's 1979 rise to power, army helicopters showered flowers on jubilant crowds in Tehran. In

neighbouring Afghanistan, Tehran's military aircraft have been unloading emergency food. In January Iranian C-130s airlifted aid to Kabul; in December, to the famine-threatened central Afghan area of Hazarajat. Says a Western diplomat: "The Iranians are coming out of their shell. They're looking to be a much bigger player in the region."

Of Afghanistan's 17.7-million people, 15%-20% are Shias, Iran's majority sect. More than 2 million of them are Persian-speaking, mostly Hazara people of Mongol origin. Poor even by Afghan standards, they have suffered for centuries from religious persecution from Pushtun rulers. When Iran gave them guns, their status began to rise. While Iran was fighting Iraq in the 1980s, its aid to the Afghan Shia guerrillas was limited. But recently Iran has been taking a deeper interest. Says one analyst: "There has been heavy movement by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps in and out of the country."

In 1990 Tehran encouraged eight Shia mujahideen factions to form the Islamic Unity Party. Inside Afghanistan Iranian Revolutionary Guards train Shia guerrillas and extend technical help. In the refugee camps of Peshawar in Pakistan, Iran-backed Shia groups tried hard to gain a bigger say in an Afghan government-in-exile. They eventually refused to join it because it was dominated by Sunnis.

Iran is also making other moves in Central Asia. Many are economic. In mid-February it announced a "Caspian Sea Cooperation Zone" with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia. This is separate from the ECO, a group that includes Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and several of the ex-Soviet republics. Meanwhile Iran is taking a role in the U.N.-sponsored peace process for Afghanistan. Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati met with the mujahideen's interim-government president Sibghatullah Mujadidi in Islamabad late last year.

**T**ehran's more visible hand does not sit well with everyone. Its recent flights had the permission of Afghan President Najibullah. Hard-line mujahideen based in Pakistan branded such dealing with the enemy "a disgrace to the Afghan nation." Senior military men in Islamabad, long the main supporters of the mujahideen, are also said to be displeased. The Afghan Shias are not complaining. With the backing of Iran, they may yet have a chance to change the ground rules in the new Afghanistan.

*ASIaweek*, February 28, 1992

# Afghan Rebels, Pakistan Express Support for U.N. Talks to End War

Islamabad Joins Washington, Moscow in Pledging Arms Cutoff

By Steve Coll  
Washington Post Foreign Service

PESHAWAR, Pakistan—The search for a peaceful solution to the 13-year-old Afghan conflict is gaining momentum, with growing numbers of mujaheddin rebels and the government of Pakistan offering support to a United Nations plan that would establish a new government in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has committed itself to a cutoff of arms to the Afghan rebels, matching earlier pledges by the United States and the former Soviet Union. In some cases, Pakistan has even sought to take back weapons and trucks supplied before the arms embargo, according to Afghan rebels, Pakistani officials and diplomats.

Five months after Washington and Moscow announced the end of their proxy war in Afghanistan, sporadic fighting is continuing inside the country, and there remain many uncertainties about the U.N. talks. However, a series of policy reversals during the last three weeks has generated a mood of cautious optimism around the peace process. These developments include:

- Pakistan, which has armed and funded the mujaheddin for a decade, decided on Jan. 25 to abandon its two-track policy of military backing for the rebels and simultaneous support for peace negotiations. Instead, Islamabad said it would fully support the U.N. talks.

- Following a six-day meeting near Khost, Afghanistan, a council of several hundred independent rebel military commanders issued a statement Feb. 4 announcing, for the first time, that they would not oppose the U.N. negotiations. The commanders rejected a cease-fire, however, until the Kabul government of President Najibullah is replaced, an action contemplated by the U.N. plan.

- On Feb. 8, three of the seven main mujaheddin political leaders in Pakistan issued a joint statement declaring that the U.N. talks—and not continued military pressure—offered the best way to resolve the Afghan conflict.

- Four other Islamic conservative mujaheddin leaders, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, have rejected the U.N. process publicly, calling it part of a conspiracy against their holy war to overthrow the Kabul government. However, Hekmatyar and some other radical Islamic leaders have continued to meet with the chief U.N. negotiator, Benon Sevan, to discuss his proposal. It is not clear whether the radicals would continue to push for a military solution if the U.N. plan advances.

■ A major difference between these developments and past efforts to forge peace in fractious Afghanistan is that this time, Pakistan appears to be fully committed to a political solution, spurred by its desire to open land trading routes through Afghanistan to the five Muslim republics in Central Asia that became independent following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Such routes depend on peace in Afghanistan.

■ "If we make mistakes now, then instead of having five potential economic allies and partners [in Central Asia], we're going to get five potential enemies," said Sardar Asf Ali, Pakistan's minister of state for economic affairs, who lobbied for the change in Afghan policy after a three-week tour of Central Asia in December. "The other side is that we've stood by these people [mujaheddin] for 12 years and why should we lose them? And my counter-argument was that we're not talking about losing them, but about a rational solution."

Besides its desire to trade in Central Asia, Pakistan's shift was driven by the collapse of the Soviet threat in the region and the continuing failure of the mujaheddin to achieve significant military victories, according to Pakistani officials.

Pakistan's influential army, led by a new chief, Gen. Asif Nawaz, and the military Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, which in the past funneled weapons to the Afghan rebels, are said by government officials to support fully the new Afghan policy. The ISI chief, Maj. Gen. Asad Durrani, met with mujaheddin leaders Feb. 9 and told them, in effect, "Our objective hasn't changed, but this [U.N. talks] is how we're going to do it," as quoted by a source familiar with the meeting.

"I think the army is squarely behind this position," said Riaz Mohammed Khan, a Pakistani Foreign Ministry official who is a member of the Afghan Cell, a senior-level committee of bureaucrats and generals that sets Pakistan's policy toward the war. Whether the change will be permanent depends on how the situation in Afghanistan develops, he said.

Meanwhile, Pakistan has clamped down on material aid to the mujaheddin, according to Afghan rebels and others. There have been reports that some mujaheddin military camps across the border are shutting down and that Afghan weapons drivers have been laid off. "In certain instances, Pakistan has turned its back. We didn't expect that," said Syed Hussain Anwari, a mujaheddin commander who leads a force near Kabul.

Anwari said that while rebel commanders would like to fight on against Najibullah, whom they see as weak and vulnerable, they are hindered by continuing disunity and a shortage of supplies. The commanders "would prefer a military solution, but this is the next best thing" if the U.N. talks lead to Najibullah's resignation, he said.

Among the rebel leaders said to be willing to give the U.N. talks a chance are two of the most influential commanders inside Afghanistan, Jalaluddin Haqqani, whose forces captured the Afghan city of Khost in a rare rebel military victory last year, and Ahmed Shah Massoud, who controls much of northeastern Afghanistan.

The talks themselves are still at a precarious stage. U.N. mediators are attempting to assemble a list of about 150 non-controversial, respected Afghans—including some from Kabul, but none from President Najibullah's formerly communist Watan Party. They would assemble this spring in Turkey or Switzerland.

The assembly would attempt to choose a smaller working group that would select an interim government. If it succeeds, it is hoped that Najibullah would then resign, as he has said he would if the circumstances were right. With Najibullah out, the interim administration would attempt to organize either elections or a similar "exercise in Afghan self-determination."

The biggest worries about the U.N. talks are that the first assembly will not have broad enough support among the various armed Afghan factions, that Najibullah will renege on his intermittent promises to step aside, or that an unexpected military development inside Afghanistan will derail the talks.

THE WASHINGTON POST

FEBRUARY 15, 1992



## Afghanistan becomes largest opium producer

According to a United Nations publication, Afghanistan produced more than 2,000 tons of opium in 1990, replacing Burma as the world's largest producer of this deadly crop.

Most of Afghanistan's opium is processed in the almost inaccessible areas along the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is then smuggled to the West through Pakistan and Iran.

The UN International Drug Control Programme (UNIDCP) reported that some 70 percent of all heroin seized in Europe has its origin in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, a significant and growing part of the opium production is consumed in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the report added.

Consequently, in both countries levels of addiction have risen alarmingly, with children becoming increasingly vulnerable. In Afghanistan children as young as 11 years old have followed treatment and detoxification.

The UNIDCP report placed the number of heroin addicts in Kabul at 5,000, and heroin addicts in the province of Badkhashan at over 100,000.

Because governmental authority in most of Afghanistan is almost non-existent, the crop substitution program in Afghanistan is at a standstill. However, UN sources are confident that with the Afghan leaders' opposition to poppy cultivation, that the drug problem will decline as peace returns to that war-torn country.

Afghan farmers have said that the present high poppy cultivation is due to the destruction of their traditional crops and irrigation systems. It is hoped that when the war is over that normal farming will replace opium cultivation.

The UN is planning to combat drugs on three fronts: to help farmers revert to their traditional crops; to alert people to the harm caused by drugs; and to rehabilitate drug users through health programs.

## Kabul's Coca-Cola battles Pepsi

The Associated Press reported that Kabul is engaged in a commercial struggle between Coca-Cola and Pepsi.

"Coke is back," said Suraya Rahim Majid, who belongs to one of Kabul's wealthiest trading families. "We will start in Kabul and then move out."

While most Afghans struggle to survive, Ms. Majid spent \$2 million to modernize her 15-year-old plant, located near Kabul's Defense Ministry. The Pepsi franchise had promised to "flood every nook of the mountainous, war-torn country - except for combat zones - but in October learned that its Japanese equipment was obsolete." Experts from Germany and the Netherlands corrected the problem. However, Coca-Cola has already delivered 10,000 crates of its product to the Afghan market, winning the race against Pepsi.

Internet 'l Review

March - May 1992

# Six million Afghan refugees unable, unwilling to go home

By MELISSA B. ROBINSON  
THE BALTIMORE SUN

**BADABER, Pakistan** — Zabihullah Bitab doesn't remember much of life before his family came 13 years ago to this dusty, sprawling refugee camp in northwestern Pakistan.

Still, the energetic 15-year-old says he would like to go back across the arid mountains to his native Afghanistan to pursue his goal of becoming a doctor. Or an architect.

"We want to work," he says of the Badaber refugees. "I'd like to become a doctor, but we haven't the money for this. . . I want to go to school. I want to live in the city."

Zabihullah's family, however, like the estimated 3 million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan — mostly in and around Peshawar — probably will not go back any time soon, if at all.

Technically, the war in Afghanistan is over. U.S. military aid, which included weapons from artillery to shoulder-launched Stinger missiles, provided to the Afghan resistance fighters known as mujahadeen officially stopped Jan. 1, as did the flow of Russian arms to the Najibullah government in Kabul.

Remaining are more than 6 million displaced Afghans — by far the largest refugee population in the world — who are being held hostage by a complicated set of political and economic conditions created by more than 12 years of war.

They are, in essence, exiles either unable or unwilling to go home, according to interviews with refugees, Peshawar merchants, government officials, relief workers and political experts.

"It's a difficult place to go back to — there's nothing to go back to," says one Bush administration official, who nonetheless insists that the "great bulk" of the refugees eventually will return.

The United States, having fueled the war to the tune of billions of dollars in weapons and humanitarian aid for the mujahadeen, has contributed another \$1.2 billion in refugee relief and recently began channeling millions of dollars to the U.N. appeal for Afghan repatriation.

Still, the obstacles for refugees to return are myriad. They are loath to return to rule by the same leftist regime Islamic forces have been trying

to topple since 1979. There is warring among the seven mujahadeen factions. And there are 20 million mines, by U.S. estimates, still embedded in the country.

The exiles, simply put, "are stuck," says Shahab Zaman, the refugee liaison officer for Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, home to at least 2.2 million people in 258 camps. "It's not that they do not want to go back," Zaman says. "There are genuine reasons."

As Mohammed Naeem Khan, the province's refugee protocol officer, says: "A bullet from a Soviet gun or an Afghan gun will kill you the same way."

Afghanistan has been decimated by the war. More than two-thirds of the infrastructure including agriculture, housing and roads was destroyed. 1.5 million people were killed, and a third of the population fled. Yet some refugees like Zabihullah still hope to cross the border and find one, clear shot at a better life.

"It's very hard," he says of Badaber.

Zabihullah's uncle supports the extended family — he and eight others live in a small, mud house while nearby dwellings house his grandmother, uncles, aunts and cousins — with proceeds from a small variety store set up along a pell-mell commercial strip in the camp.

"We haven't money; we haven't salary," Zabihullah says, explaining that his father has worked for one of the Afghan resistance groups without pay for a year.

Zabihullah says his family would return if Najibullah was overthrown and Afghanistan was made "free." But until then, they have little reason to give up a stable, if limited and difficult, existence for a highly precarious situation.

While Pakistan clearly hopes most of the refugees will ultimately leave, officials are deeply worried that international concern over the Afg-

hans' plight is waning because of an onslaught of new international crises, such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the exodus of Iraq's Kurds after the Persian Gulf war.


Struggling with its own poverty and development problems, Pakistan, which by all accounts has done a good job of caring for a huge refugee population, fears that it will be forever supporting the displaced Afghans. Another 2 million refugees are in Iran; the remaining 1 million are scattered throughout the world.

Adding to Pakistan's worry is the fact that international aid to the Afghans has slackened off, exacerbating the economic pressure while creating worsening conditions in the camps.

The basic food baskets the refugees receive, for example, used to contain six or seven items, including wheat, milk and cooking oil. But in recent months, they have been filled with little more than wheat, according to government and relief workers.

"Unfortunately, people are forgetting about Afghanistan; the world's moved on to other things," says an official of the Bush administration. "We have a moral responsibility to help them. We were sending weapons to them."

Asbury Park Press/Sunday, February 16, 1992



# Afghan President Says U.S. Should See Him as Ally

By EDWARD A. GARGAN  
Special to The New York Times

KABUL, Afghanistan, March 9 — Abandoned by his former benefactors in Moscow and cast somewhat adrift in the new politics of the region, Afghanistan's President made an impassioned appeal to the United States today to help his country become a bulwark against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia.

In an interview here, President Najibullah also pleaded for immediate economic and humanitarian assistance from Washington, which long backed the Afghan fundamentalist guerrillas fighting his Government. He also promised that he would release four Afghans who worked in the United States Embassy and were convicted of espionage in 1983.

The Afghan President's praise for the United States and his attempt to enlist Washington in common cause against fundamentalism marked the sharpest departure yet from the open hostility that has characterized relations between Kabul and Washington since Afghanistan's leftist coup of 1978.

## An Uncertain Future

His appeal reflected not only the loss of support from Moscow and the vastly changed politics of the region but also his sense of uncertainty about his place in a future Afghanistan as well as his acute awareness of his country's desperation.

"We have a common task, Afghanistan, the United States of America, and the civilized world, to launch a joint struggle against fundamentalism," said Mr. Najibullah, who then described what he thought would happen to his country if Islamic extremists took power in Kabul.


"If fundamentalism comes to Afghanistan, war will continue for many more years," he said, the rust of his words repeatedly overwhelming his translator. "Afghanistan will turn into a center of world smuggling for narcotic drugs. Afghanistan will be turned into a center for terrorism."

## Support for U.N. Plan

Mr. Najibullah has promised to support a United Nations plan to summon a wide spectrum of Afghans — including the Islamic fundamentalist guerrillas — to a gathering that would lead to a political accord to end Afghanistan's years of civil conflict.

But his call for immediate aid left open to question whether he wants Washington to extend assistance while he is still in power or after a United Nations-sponsored transition from his Government is irreversibly under way. Mr. Najibullah has grown increasingly uneasy about the expected outcome of the United Nations process, which almost certainly would mean his removal from office and the dissolution of his Watan, or Homeland Party, the successor to the Soviet-inspired Communist Party he once led.

In Washington, a senior State Department official said that the United States has long viewed Mr. Najibullah as an obstacle to peace and for that reason has felt that he should leave office, although that is a decision for the Afghans to make. The official, who asked not to be named, said that Mr. Najibullah's plea for funds notwithstanding, Washington already provides large amounts of aid from a humanitarian program administered from Pakistan.



## Against Militant Islam

President Najibullah of Afghanistan, who appealed yesterday to the United States to help his country become a bulwark against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia.

[A department spokesman said there would be no direct public response to the interview.]

After 13 years of war, waged by Islamic rebels against various leftist governments and the Soviet forces, Afghanistan is a country in tatters. The years of conflict have driven six million refugees into Pakistan and Iran, prompted the country's educated classes to migrate to Europe and America and fractured the country along its already fragile ethnic fissures.

With the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in February 1989, virtually all Western nations abandoned their embassies here and ostracized Mr. Najibullah's regime. And then, with the final disintegration of the Soviet Union in December, Afghanistan's last source of economic assistance disappeared. Mr. Najibullah found himself alone in the world, and all but ignored.

In recent months the United Nations peace plan has begun to show signs of life. Pakistan, the principal benefactor of the Afghan guerrillas and the main conduit of Western arms to them, cut off its assistance in late January and said it was supporting the United Nations plan. In doing so, Islamabad abandoned its insistence on installing a fundamentalist government in Kabul, seeking instead a government that could serve as a stable bridge to fruitful economic and political ties with the new Central Asian republics formed

from the old Soviet Union. Many leaders in those republics are wary of Islamic fundamentalism.

Some of the fundamentalist guerrillas have condemned the peace efforts, declaring that only the imposition of an Islamic government will bring peace to the country. But others among the splintered guerrilla movement have agreed to participate in the peace efforts.

Mr. Najibullah spoke fervently today of his hopes for a dialogue with the United States, which at one time was shipping hundreds of millions of dollars of weapons to the fundamentalist guerrillas largely in the interest of countering Soviet dominance over the country. Repeatedly during the 40-minute interview, the President echoed a concern underlying the swing through Central Asia last month by Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d — that Islamic fundamentalism poses a significant threat to stability in the region.

"You may think that the Central Asian Republics are significant for the United States of America," he said. "That's right. But I must say that the strategic and political significance of Afghanistan is much more than these republics. If Afghanistan is lost and is turned into a center of fundamentalism, you will lose the Central Asian republics."

Mr. Najibullah, a burly man with a bushy mustache, spoke in a wood-paneled conference room dominated by a

huge map of the country and lighted by a chandelier made up of five glass globes. Dressed in a subdued blue suit and dark blue tie, the president, normally quite reserved in his discussions with journalists, gesticulated frequently, especially during his discussion of his hopes for a renewal of contacts with the United States.

## 'What Is the Obstacle?'

Most disappointing, the President said, was the refusal of the United States to talk to his Government at any level. The guerrillas, he said, had held talks with the Russian Government in Moscow, and Mr. Baker had visited the newly formed governments in Central Asia, "so what is the obstacle that the United States of America is not opening its embassy in Afghanistan?" he asked.

The last American ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph Dubs, was killed in 1979 during an attempted kidnapping. Mr. Dubs was never replaced and American representation in Kabul continued at a reduced level until the embassy closed in 1989.

In a gesture intended to demonstrate his sincerity, Mr. Najibullah said that he would offer pardons to four Afghans who worked in the old American embassy. The four were arrested in 1983 and charged with spying for the Central Intelligence Agency. "When we receive a letter from an official source of the Government of the United States of America, we will do this," the President said. "For instance, this letter could be sent through any embassy in the region, or some department in the United States of America, or through Benon Sevon," a reference to the special representative of the United Nations Secretary General to Afghanistan and who is orchestrating the latest peace effort. When asked how long it would be after receiving such a letter that the men would be released, Mr. Najibullah simply said, "Immediately."

American officials have steadfastly denied that the four men — Gulistan Sakhi Ahmadzai, Jalaludin Talibee, Mohammed Eza and Fazal Ahmad Maulana — ever engaged in espionage. Several years ago, another embassy employee who also had been imprisoned for spying was traded in a deal for several Afghan officials who were captured in Pakistan.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

MARCH 10, 1992

The 12th anniversary of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan on December 27, 1991 reminded us again that the Soviets were only the latest invaders in that country. In the 2500 years before them, at least 25 different ruling dynasties incorporated either parts or all of present-day Afghanistan into vast, and often short-lived empires. In fact, the Soviets, and before them the British, were amongst the least successful of these invaders.

Modern Afghanistan, whose founders include Mir Wais and Ahmad Shah Abdali, has in the same way rejected foreign domination as was done earlier. Moscow's rulers, both past and present, have publicly admitted their mistake of sending troops to sustain a government of their choice in Kabul and often described Afghanistan as their bleeding wound. The British also learnt at a great cost that the Afghans cannot be subjugated. Lord Lawrence, a former British Viceroy, summed up the Afghan character in the following words: "The Afghans will put up with poverty, even with the insecurity of life, but never will they tolerate to be ruled by foreigners". These examples should indeed serve as lessons of history for countries and individuals aiming to become the new kingmakers in Afghanistan. Moreover, the fate of hated Afghan rulers like Shah Shuja, Amir Yaqub and Babrak Karmal installed by outsiders should be kept in view before implanting new rulers in Kabul. Such lessons, sadly enough, are seldom learnt.

Afghans have a history of fighting against each other when there is no common enemy around. History repeated itself when the Soviet Red Army stepped into Afghanistan in the winter of 1979 and acted as a catalyst for a countrywide uprising. Even elements in the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), now renamed Watan Party, opposed the Soviet intervention and defected. President Hafizullah Amin too opposed Soviet intervention and was therefore physically eliminated to pave the way for Babrak Karmal's installation in his place. About nine years later with Soviet soldiers gone, the Afghans reverted to their old ways of fighting each other. It is now almost three years that the Red Army withdrew from Afghanistan but the fighting continues. As an Afghan friend remarked: "fighting is our national pastime and new theatres of war would have to be found for the Afghans to keep them busy once war ceases in Afghanistan."

Despite losing 14, 000 soldiers and spending 70 billion dollars during more than eight years stay in Afghanistan, the Soviets failed to achieve anything. They could neither convert the Afghans to communism nor stop the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in both Afghanistan and in the neighbouring Muslim republics in Central Asia. In fact, the recent presidential election in Tajikistan showed that the candidate backed by the banned Islamic Renaissance Party polled 34 per cent of the vote compared to the 54 per cent won by the eventual winner, Rahman Nabiev. Islamic fundamentalism is now knocking at the door of the very Republics which President Brezhnev had tried to shelter.

The Afghan civil war which the Soviets wanted to extinguish by their physical presence also continues unabated. What the Soviets were able to do was to inflict a destruction which reminded one of the devastation caused by the Mongol hordes of Genghis Khan in parts of Afghanistan 700 years ago. Moscow's inability to win in Afghanistan may also have accelerated the unravelling and the subsequent dismantling of the Soviet Union. Its decision to abandon Dr Najibullah's government by withdrawing Soviet troops in February 1989 may also have sent alarming messages to other socialist or client regimes in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world that they could no longer depend on Moscow for their survival.

Looking back at the past three years, it appears that the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan may have helped the government in Kabul much more than the Mujahideen. The stigma of having foreign troops on the Afghan soil was removed as Kabul on its own took on the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen found it increasingly difficult to justify their war against fellow Afghans as 'Jihad' or holy war. The battle for Jalalabad in the spring of 1989 two weeks after the withdrawal of Soviet troops was the turning point. Kabul repulsed the Mujahideen onslaught and proved wrong all predictions that its fall was imminent. The Mujahideen were never really able to recover from the shock of that defeat. Their military victories since then have been few and far between. The major ones were the fall of Tarinkot, capital of Urozgan province, Khost in Paktia province, and several key towns bordering the former Soviet Union in Badakhshan and Takhar provinces. These victories, however, weren't enough to sustain the feeling that the Mujahideen could still achieve a decisive military victory.

The military deadlock only exacerbated the Mujahideen problems and differences. All Mujahideen alliances until now have collapsed under the weight of rival ambitions. Back to square one is an apt description if one were to analyse the latest exercise to form the so-called Shura-i-Qiyadi Jehad or the Supreme Leadership Council. Such a Shura existed in the past until the Rawalpindi meeting in February 1989 where 400 delegates nominated by the seven Mujahideen parties elected the Peshawar-based Afghan Interim Government with Prof. Sebgatullah Mojaddedi as the President and Prof. Sayyaf as the Prime Minister. It is another matter that this government too failed to deliver. But its failure should also be seen in the light of the Mujahideen inability to score quick military victories. The resultant frustration in the Mujahideen rank and file was, therefore, not unexpected. Even the Shura-i-Qiyadi is now falling apart due to the refusal by some Mujahideen groups to become its members or accept the new unity formula.

This brings us to the question of the excessive dependence of the Afghan combatants on outside support and guidance. This over-dependence has complicated matters and delayed solution of the Afghan problem. The rival Afghan forces based in Kabul and Peshawar have become so heavily dependent on foreign aid that they are no longer immune to foreign influences. While this shows their own weaknesses, it also explains why outsiders have assumed such an important role in deciding the fate of the Afghans. Thus the Geneva Accords which achieved the Soviet troops withdrawal from Afghanistan were negotiated in proximity talks in which the government in Kabul and the Mujahideen had virtually no role whatsoever. Decisions made in Moscow, Washington, Islamabad, Tehran and Riyadh have a greater impact on Afghanistan's future than those taken in Kabul and Peshawar. With the latest decision on the arms cut-off to the Afghan combatants by Washington and Moscow, we are again witnessing the helplessness of the Afghan people with regard to their future.

The PDPA or Watan party, which swept into power on April 27, 1978 through a military coup d'etat and ended the 2300-year rule of Durrani Pashoons in Afghanistan was never a party of the masses. Born in 1965, the party had no more than 6,000 members 13 years later when it captured power. The absence of industrial labour and the lack of organised peasantry meant that the party's founders could only hope to spread their influence among the urban intelligentsia and students. The PDPA was definitely a communist party as its manifesto, having frequent references to Marxism-Leninism, shows. With such a small base, the PDPA could hardly aspire to come into power through democratic means. Thus a 'short-

cut' was found and efforts made to win over military officials. The strategy worked as the soldiers who ousted President Daoud immediately handed over power to the party, but it meant that the rulers would have to increasingly rely on state power, often brutally, to sustain themselves in power. Hafizullah Amin had once boasted that the Saur Revolution is as irreversible as the Bolshevik Revolution. Both the 'revolutions' are gone and Amin too met his death at the hands of his former Soviet friends. The 'children of history', the name given to PDPA workers by Nur Mohammad Taraki, have renounced whatever their party once stood for and have embraced ideas which they once loathed.

The 'short-cut' formula has however set a precedent. It has been tried by leaders of various PDPA factions and by the Mujahideen. Former defence minister Gen. Shahnawaz Tanai failed to repeat it in March 1990 while Mujahideen leader Gulbaddin Hikmatyar hasn't given up and is always hopeful of a change from within. Unlike alliances have thus been shaped in a bid to capture power, with extreme leftists joining hands with hardline rightists to topple Najib. More such attempts are likely to be made and some may succeed in a future Afghanistan, though it remains to be seen as to how a coup d'état can achieve peace, restore stability and manage national reconciliation. The resort to such short-cut tactics also creates the feeling that bulk of the Mujahideen no longer are hopeful of a military victory and are willing to join hands with ambitious and adventurous soldiers to remove the government in Kabul. Najib is also threatened by factionalism in his party, even though the Khalqis have been more or less sidelined. But threat of a coup by disgruntled Parchamis with the help of army officials remains.

The Mujahideen disunity is only a replica of the factionalism in Watan party. One reason of Najib's survival is the chronic lack of unity in Mujahideen ranks. Even though two presidents, Taraki and Amin, got killed and a third, Babrak Karmal was exiled, the government in Kabul has managed to present a semblance of unity unlike the Mujahideen who for the past 12 years have seldom agreed. The absence of a credible and unified alternative has also prolonged Najib's rule.

Several examples could be cited to highlight the damaging fallout of the Mujahideen infighting but the Kunar example is the most striking. Mujahideen made tremendous sacrifices to occupy Kunar in October 1988, only to convert it into a battleground for rival groups battling for its control. Such infighting has neither served as an inspiration for Mujahideen nor for Afghan refugees anxious to return home to liberated places like Kunar. It has only provided propaganda points to the government in Kabul. One shudders to think of the scenario if the Mujahideen were to enact the happenings in Kunar elsewhere in Afghanistan. Similarly, bloody Mujahideen clashes in northern Afghanistan have provided the much-needed respite to the government.

The Mujahideen parties, most of which are artificial creations and were launched on alien soil, suffer from the same ethnic and sectarian divide which has kept the PDPA permanently divided. Khalq is Pashtoon-dominated while Parcham is identified with Persian-speakers. Pashtoons are present in all Mujahideen parties but Tajiks and other non-Pashtoons find themselves more comfortable in Jamiat-i-Islami. Then there are the Sunni and Shia Mujahideen groups. This brings us to the question of the numerous contradictions in Afghanistan in misleading because it isn't in the real sense the 'land of the Afghans' which conveys homogeneity. Afghanistan is in fact the term used by other communities to describe the dominant ethnic group, i.e., the Pashtoons. Afghanistan may be an anthropologist's dream with its 22 distinct ethnic groups and 31 languages but such a diversity is a nightmare for politicians wanting to preserve the country's unity.

To make matters worse, all the ethnic groups transcend Afghan borders and are present in bigger or smaller numbers in neighbouring countries. Islam is thus the only common de-

ominator but it is not necessarily enough to control centrifugal tendencies. The former Soviet Central Asian republics are bound to affect and be affected by the happenings in Afghanistan. One big question mark is whether there will be a move for unity among the ethnic groups living on both sides of the border. Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Kirghiz, all of whom are ethnic minorities in Afghanistan, have independent republics across the border in the shape of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia and Kirghizia. Many people have for long considered the Hindukush a natural boundary with the areas lying on the other side of the mountain range by non-Pashtoons bound to separate from Afghanistan one day and link up with peoples of the same race beyond the Amu Darya. Jamiat-i-Islami commander Ahmad Shah Masood is already being accused of sowing the seeds of Afghanistan's disintegration by forming the Supervisory Council of the North or 'Shura-i-Nazzar' that operates in ten northern provinces peopled mainly by non-Pashtoons and discouraging Pashtoons from returning to their homes in these provinces. These Pashtoons, settled there by Atshan rulers over the past few hundred years, are called Naqaleen or settlers by the non-Pashtoons.

Pakistan however cannot afford further instability in Afghanistan, especially one caused by ethnic strife. It can have a damaging fallout on its own minorities, especially Pashtoon and Baluchis encourage a free flow of arms and drugs, minorities, and push a fresh stream of refugees into its soil. One is tempted to recall that Pakistan received the first batch of Afghan refugees in 1959-60 when the Pakhtoonistan issue was being agitated by the then Prime Minister, Daoud. More refugees came to Pakistan in the mid-1970s after the failed uprisings in Panjshir and elsewhere in Afghanistan, again against Daoud. The biggest influx was however witnessed after the Afghan coup and Soviet military intervention, breaking all previous records. Pakistan would in future also remain a natural destination for Afghans fleeing their country for one or the other reason. Therefore, any instability or strife in Afghanistan would keep burdening Pakistan with refugees and creating a host of problems. In fact, all countries of the region like Iran, China, Turkey, India, Russia and Central Asian republics have regional and ethnic problems like Pakistan and none would support disintegration of Afghanistan on ethnic basis because it would create complications for them.

The military ad political deadlock in Afghanistan is not in Pakistan's interest either. Islamabad now has a vested interest to help restore peace and stability in Afghanistan as that would not only achieve repatriation of the Afghan refugees but also provide Pakistan an access to the Central Asian Muslim republics. Pakistan presently finds itself handicapped in its efforts to befriend these republics, which offer immense possibilities in terms of trade and joint ventures. Pakistan may be able to gain land access to Kirghizia and Kazakhstan via China's Sinkiang province by linking up the fabled Silk Route but there is no other land route except Afghanistan to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia and beyond to Europe. Kabul too stands to benefit from the opportunities knocking at its door. One is tempted to believe that these republics would have considered the option of achieving full independence rather than becoming members of the Commonwealth of Independent States had there been viable alternative arrangements in their neighbourhood. Landlocked and with the lowest per capita incomes in the former Soviet Union, they were frightened to achieve full independence after having remained politically and economically dependent on Russia and Moscow for 72 long years. They were thus the foremost in trying to preserve the union or reach some other arrangement with Russia and other republics because Iran, Turkey and Pakistan were not equipped or ready to embrace them and Afghanistan was locked in a war with itself.

The negative symmetry agreement between Moscow and Washington would hopefully place an embargo on fresh arm



supplies to the Afghan combatants but fighting is unlikely to end abruptly as both sides are armed to the teeth and possess stockpiles that can last several months. They also have other sources of supply, while Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have yet to make public their commitment to abide by the arms cut-off. In any case, there can be no big battles until spring due to the snow and cold. Even beyond spring much fighting cannot be anticipated because the Mujahideen presently appear badly divided and dejected to be able to launch a big offensive against the cities controlled by Kabul. Still skirmishes would continue, law and order would deteriorate, and peace would remain elusive until a solution acceptable to all sides is found. The five-point formula thus offers the best hope of achieving peace through an intra-Afghan dialogue. Mujahideen refusal to talk to the Najib regime may be justified on emotional and moral basis, but realism demands that the Afghans talk to each other to resolve their disputes. Moscow too has made its position clear after having aroused hopes in the Mujahideen camp in Moscow talks by agreeing to instal an Islamic government. If one were to believe Russian Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi, his country doesn't want to commit another mistake and interfere in Afghan affairs by removing Najib from power and replacing him with the Mujahideen. Mujahideen by asking Moscow to instal them in power in place of Najib are in fact betraying their inability to do so on their own.

The government in Kabul may be hated by bulk of the Afghans but it presently represents a reality. Mujahideen inability to topple it has lessened their bargaining position. They would have to deal with it as long as it controls Kabul, because past central governments in Afghanistan have seldom extended their writ to each and every area. The world has undergone a change and almost all disputes which plagued the world during the Cold War have been peacefully resolved. The parties to these disputes however showed enough flexibility to reach solutions. The world is also fast losing interest in Afghanistan, one evidence of which is western media's indifference and declining international help for Afghan refugees. Questions are being asked as to why should one pursue anti-communism when communism is dead. The Cambodian solution in which all combatants have agreed to lay down arms is one model on which an Afghan settlement could be built. But such a solution could only be reached if the combatants refrain from monopolising power and show sincerity of purpose in restoring peace to their war-ravaged country.

Najib is hard-pressed due to the unprecedented changes in the Soviet Union, but he has reasons to remain cheerful because Russia hasn't completely abandoned him and former communists-turned-democrats are ruling his neighbouring Central Asian republics, who like his government are confronted with a challenge by growing Islamic fundamentalism. The Najib government, by portraying the Mujahideen as inflexible and highlighting its commitment to Western ideals like emancipation of women and the battle against drugs, has also tried to woo the West. It has scored some victories in Europe with the decision by France and Italy to reopen embassies in Kabul. The United States is however still adamant and has given no hint of giving the badly-needed legitimacy to the government in Kabul. In our neighbourhood, both Iran and Turkey have softened their attitude towards Kabul. There now even exists an impression that Pakistan is competing with Iran and Saudi Arabia to extend their influence in Afghanistan.

Instead of insisting on a Mujahideen government in Kabul and excluding other equally strong forces from power, Pakistan would do well to strive for a government of national unity for an interim period leading to elections. Neither the Watan party government nor the Peshawar and Iran-based Mujahideen groups could claim to speak for all Afghans until they have proved their popularity through elections. A broad-

based government in Kabul is the best guarantee to bring peace to the country and heal the wounds of the last 13 years, which indeed would be difficult due to revenge killings and blood-feuds generated by the war. Pakistan has every reason to expect a friendly government in Kabul after having rendered unparalleled sacrifices for the Afghan people. It would also expect its western borders to be no longer hostile as in the past so that it doesn't face the terrible scenario of a two-front war, the other being India, in future. Pakistan has by now earned enough goodwill in Afghanistan, even on the rival side because almost every Afghan family has sent members to take refuge here. Dr Najib's brother Siddiqullah sought refuge in Pakistan, and so have the fleeing Khalqis, Parchamis and those belonging to Settem-i-Melli and Afghan Mellat, all leftist and nationalist groups. Pakistan however must tread carefully so that it isn't seen to be overbearing while dealing with the Afghans. In a future Afghanistan, political parties would largely be viewed in context of their pro and anti-Pakistan policies. Islamabad's economic interests too are now more closely linked with Afghanistan and its consumer goods have almost a monopoly in Afghan markets. A situation where pro-Pakistan parties may lose elections in Afghanistan, as is the case in Bangladesh where the pro-India Awami League is unable to win, must not be allowed to develop.

It seems God Almighty too is not very pleased with the Mujahideen because some of them have violated the spirit of 'Jehad' by killing prisoners of war, mistreating people in conquered areas, looting captured towns, and showing no respect to the dead from the enemy side. The UN rapporteur Felix Ermacora has in his latest report accused both Kabul and Mujahideen of violating human rights. Such abuses have only vitiated the atmosphere and further polarised the country.

Now that the Great Game is about to start all over again in this part of the world with new players and sponsors, one is tempted to refer to Afghanistan's national game, Buzkashi, as a metaphor to describe the present plight of the country and its people. Afghanistan has become the headless goat being snatched and ripped apart both by the Afghans and by contending foreign powers as if a Buzkashi game was being played. Perhaps the Afghans would be able to solve their problems with a little prodding by outsiders instead of blatant interference.



## REBEL-HELD AFGHANISTAN

### Following Marco Polo Into the Wakhan Corridor

#### 'Highest Place in the World'

By ANTHONY DAVIS

I adjust the binoculars and the sentry springs into sudden focus. On the road 100 metres away, he walks up to a red sedan and leans in to check the driver's ID. He's dressed in camouflage fatigues, an AK-74 rifle slung across his back. Under his bush hat are fair hair and an unmistakably Slavic face.

The proximity is unnerving. In the years I've been covering the Afghan war from the side of the mujahideen, this man has been the "enemy." But now only a river and a border separate us and, in this remote corner of Afghanistan at least, there is a guarded peace.

I'm standing outside the town of Ishkashim, recently captured by the guer-

illas. Around me two of Asia's mightiest ranges — the Pamirs and the Hindu Kush — converge in an awe-

some tangle of snow-covered peaks. At my feet flow the turbulent headwaters of the Oxus, or Amu Darya, which rises a week's march to the east on the Roof of the World. Before emptying into the Turkmen deserts and the dying Aral Sea, it marks for much of its course the border between Afghanistan and what is, as I write this, still called the Soviet Union.

Another guard with binoculars is now studying me intently from a small sentry box. I shift my field-glasses and watch him watching me. The Cold War is over — I grin and raise my hand in mock salute. But Ivan is not amused; there's no answering salute. Peace may have come to Ishkashim. Cordiality has not.

That evening I eat with mujahideen officers and John Jennings, an American journalist on assignment for Reuters, in what is grandiosely termed "The Club." A small wooden bungalow in a walled garden near the bazaar, it served in happier times as a staging post for royal hunting parties travelling into the Wakhan Corridor. Today it's a guest-house for Ishkashim's new masters, whose hunting instincts are focused on government game holed up to the northwest in Faizabad, capital of Badakhshan province.

Our host is a Dr. Asadullah, a young officer on the staff of local commander Sayyid Najmuddin. Now in control of much of Badakhshan, Najmuddin operates under the Supervisory Council, an alliance of northern guerilla com-

manders. This summer the council rolled up a string of government border garrisons to emerge as the predominant rebel force in the north.

As we sit cross-legged around platters of spiced rice and bowls of yoghurt, Asadullah explains his new — and not yet familiar — duties as a border liaison officer. Ishkashim fell to Najmuddin's troops in July. Within days the Soviets had requested a meeting with the mujahideen. Now once or twice a month Asad and a couple of fellow officers walk down to a bridge across the Oxus and meet a Soviet delegation on a flat, barren island in midstream.

"First they wanted to install a telephone link but we didn't see that as necessary," explains Asad. His sense of humour hasn't suffered in a decade of war: "We told them that whenever they had something to discuss they could hoist a white flag on their side of the river."

His counterparts on the other bank want assurances that their new neighbours won't rock an already leaky boat. Perennially paranoid over border security, the crumbling Soviet military is alarmed over the armed rebels camped along its border. Understandably enough. These are old and bitter enemies now confidently building a revolutionary Islamic dispensation a stone's throw from Muslim Tajikistan. In the Persian-speaking republic, a homegrown Islamic movement is already at the vanguard of opposition politics.

But for now neither of Ishkashim's armed neighbours wishes to provoke the other. The mujahideen are consolidating their hold on newly won territory and don't need artillery or air strikes from the north. The Soviets are keen to reach an accommodation on the basis of "new realities." The fate of the former government garrison is ample evidence of that.

Kabul's troops were complete in a Beau Geste-style fort, complete with squat towers and thick mud walls, off the town's single-street bazaar. Next morning, pushing open the fort's heavy wooden gates, I wander into a deserted courtyard dotted with shady trees and cut through by a stream.

The detritus of defeat is everywhere. Discarded steel helmets, uniforms, belts and ammunition pouches are scattered around the barracks. Outside, the ground is littered with files and documents, records of an administration the victors have consigned to history. The arsenal, its door yawning open, is stacked with booty: hundreds of crates of mortar rounds, artillery shells, heavy-machine-gun and rifle ammunition, and detonators.

I'm joined by Daulat Beg, a local greybeard now employed as a caretaker. The garrison, he explains in heavily accented local Persian, never fought.

Once the town of Zebak, a six-hour march away, fell after a vicious three-day battle, the government troops knew the game was up. So did the Soviets. Determined to avoid another pitched battle — this time right on their doorstep — the Russians not only declined to provide their allies with supplies, but refused them permission to take sanctuary over the border. So much, I reflect, for friends in need...



The conscripts did what they have generally done over ten years of war — threw down their weapons. Officers with more to lose scrambled into helicopters for evacuation to Faizabad. One chopper that didn't make it lies like a beached whale in a cornfield outside the fort, a victim of overloading or mechanical failure. Those left behind fled along the only road still open — east into the Wakhan Corridor.

Now, armed with permission from Najmuddin, we follow their tracks. We haven't seen motor transport since the Pakistan border three days ago, so Jennings and I are on foot. Our horse-man, with the packs and his own considerable bulk across the beast's back, brings up the rear.

From Ishkashim, a two-hour march under a broiling sun brings us into the Wakhan. "Corridor" is no exaggeration. To the south, on our right, rises an abrupt wall of serrated peaks 6,000-7,600 metres high, separating us from Pakistan. Across wheat fields a few hundred metres to our left flows the Oxus. On its northern bank is another strip of fields, some farms and a road — then another mountain wall, the stark massif of the Pamirs. Here, between the river-border and the flank of the Hindu Kush, Afghanistan for all practical purposes shrinks to a width of 300 metres.

We're at the mouth of a geopolitical oddity that only the sublime arrogance of European imperial cartography could have contrived. To avoid friction between the territories of Alexander, "Czar of All the Russias," and those of Victoria, "Empress of India," London and St. Petersburg decided in 1895 that Russian acquisitions in the Pamirs and British India's northern satrapies should not meet. Dragoned into this scheme was Abdur Rahman, the amir of Afghanistan. To his domains — already a buffer between Russian and British empires — was summarily added the Wakhan, a sliver of territory on average just a few kilometres wide and 270 km long, stretching from Ishkashim to the marches of Chinese Turkestan. Afghanistan suddenly found itself with a border with China.

Twentieth-century politics has wrought an almost surreal time warp. On



our side of the river not much appears to have changed since 1273, when Marco Polo's caravan plodded up this same track, then a branch of the Silk Road. In the fields ragged groups of Wakhi peasants are bent double harvesting wheat with crude scythes as they have for centuries. In the rough stone houses of the villages we pass, electricity is a dream. Transport is a donkey, a horse or two feet.

taxes — for schools and public works "rather than going into the pirs' own pockets." And he's already drafting local



Ismailis for the Supervisory Council's once-all-Sunni Islamic Army. Integration of the Wakhan Ismailis into the rest of the Sunni northeast looks to be the order of the day.

From Qazdeh the road cuts up into wilder, rockier country. The wheat fields are gone and the river that parallels the track is a rushing caudron only 30 metres wide. A morose herd of shaggy Bactrian camels eyes us warily. We are climbing with every step.

"When the traveller leaves this place [Ishkashim]," wrote Marco Polo, "he goes three days journey towards the northeast, through mountains all the time, climbing so high that this is said to be the highest place in the world." I reckon we're now above 4,000 metres. Mountain torrents cut across our track as they tumble down from the jagged snowbound ramparts to the south. There are no bridges. Our horseman, by this time way ahead, rides over. Jennings and I flounder across on foot, cursing the waist-high current.

Next day the valley broadens and flattens out. We trudge across a wide *dashi*, a black-gravel desert swept bare by constant driving wind and stretching away to the east seemingly forever. Above tower the silent peaks dividing the valley from Pakistan. On the face of this immense emptiness the human being is reduced to insignificance. After the frenzied there is food here for the soul.

But by nightfall philosophy, like the air, is wearing thin. We've been on the go for ten hours on a few mouthfuls of stale bread. I'm footsore, tired and hungry, and the rough track winds on into the darkness. Across the river the pinprick headlights of a motor vehicle mock me from another century. Finally we halt at a hamlet of three rough stone houses called Uroop, set back from the river amid struggling upland wheat fields.

Uroop and its wretched inhabitants are about as poor as you can get and still function economically. Their houses have no guest rooms. But our self-appointed host, a farmer named Sayyid Ali Shah, leads us to a small mud-walled enclosure that protects us from the wind. Cushions are spread for us to recline on and Ali Shah brings bread and plain rice cooked in milk. I notice our horseman, a Sunni who is quick to scorn our Ismaili host's religious beliefs behind his back, has no trouble stomachaching his food.

In the dim glow of a hurricane lamp, Sayyid Ali Shah's war unfolds, the tragedy of his country writ small. Like most locals he was drafted into government ranks. He served two tours of duty. Then, confronted with the prospect of promotion and another stretch, he

signed his own discharge papers by putting a bullet through his shoulder. Now he is home to wring a subsistence from an unforgiving soil. I wonder how long before his twelve-year-old son is drafted into someone else's army, but I keep my thoughts to myself.

I get up to stretch my legs. The moon has not yet risen but the heavens are studded with an infinity of stars, each intensely bright. Across the darkened, windswept fields electric lights are burning in some lonely guard-post on the Tajikistan bank. As its occupants are doubtless aware, events north of the river are on the move too. My short-wave radio reports demonstrations in the republic's capital, Dushanbe, and a state of emergency imposed as local party chiefs dig in.

**T**he Great Game for control of Central Asia, dormant for decades, is gathering momentum anew. The British have long since quit; now the Russians are in full retreat. New players are emerging. The future is wide open. On both sides of the river, the green banners of Islam are unfurled and on the march. ■

Anthony Davis is an Asiaweek contributor based in Bangkok.

ASIaweek, JANUARY 10, 1992

A poster appearing in Peshawar in January



**A**cross the river, within easy shouting distance, is another age. Soviet-built trucks and jeeps rumble along a sealed road lined with telephone wires. The locals are harvesting crops with machinery. Their neatly painted brick houses are lit with electricity. Along with the amenities, modernity has also brought the watchtowers, the KGB and 70 years of religious repression.

On both banks of the river the local Wakhis are Shias of the Ismaili sect. On this side, longstanding aversion to the prospect of a Sunni Islamic state championed by the mujahideen has made the Wakhis natural supporters of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul. Since the Afghan war erupted in 1978, Zebak, Ishkashim and the Wakhan had been under firm Kabul control, the mujahideen for once bereft of popular support.

At midday, still in the valley's lower reaches, we halt at a large village called Qazdeh. We're invited to break bread with Shah Langar, an Ismaili *pir* or saint. The Ismailis pay ultimate spiritual allegiance to their "Imam of the Present," the Agha Khan. But hereditary pirs with networks of *murids* or disciples exercise huge sway, collecting tithes and bestowing blessings.

This is my first lunch with a living saint and it's not what I'd envisaged. Shah Langar is no venerable white-beard but rather a well-to-do, personable fellow in this late 30s, clean-shaven save for a trim moustache. While hospitable, he is not overly given to conversation — understandable considering that his status in the new scheme of things is somewhat delicate.

Since the guerilla takeover, he says, there's been no trouble with the mujahideen. After the fall of Ishkashim, Najmuddin declared a general amnesty and all regime personnel — including those who fled into the Wakhan — surrendered and were permitted to go home unharmed. There were no excesses, no executions, no repercussions. Times, I reflect, are changing. Not long ago I saw captured government officers with communist affiliations drafted and led off to firing squads.

With religion, too, the new rulers are treading lightly. In private the Sunni guerillas make no bones about their disdain for the Ismailis. But Shah Langar assures us they're permitted to practise their religious rites freely. How long this hands-off policy lasts remains to be seen. Najmuddin has told me his administration will soon start collecting religious

# Afghan Airlift

## MAC provides a lift to wounded veterans who fought the Soviet invasion.

**S**EVEN miles up, high above the Arabian desert, the C-141B roared through the night, making its way from Rawalpindi, Pakistan, to Andrews AFB, Md. Capt. Ted Buck, one of the crew for MAC 101, was fixing the ship's position when a passenger began climbing a ladder up to the flight deck.

Captain Buck noticed that the visitor, hardly more than a boy, was having difficulty with the climb. On closer examination, the reason was only too obvious: The lad had one arm. He waved off offers of help. "It's these," he said, pointing to his legs. "It will be easier if I take them off." With that, Abdul Rahman Sahak, using his one arm, removed not one but two artificial legs.

The astonished crew members and the twenty-two-year-old Afghan soon settled down into an animated conversation. The youth talked about the Afghan freedom fighters, of which he was one; about the war against the Soviet military occupiers; and how he and fellow guerrillas, trying one day to take an enemy outpost, got hit by a score of shells, one of which destroyed three of his limbs.

Now, Abdul Rahman knew, he shortly would be in the West, preparing to receive medical attention and therapy of a kind unavailable in his homeland.

On paper, MAC 101 might seem another workaday USAF mission, but in the minds of the crew, part of Military Airlift Command's 6th Military Airlift Squadron, this late-November flight lingers vividly. The same can be said of the many other mercy flights that MAC has flown in support of the Afghans for more than five years.

These missions, never officially "Classified" but closely held until now, were known as "McCormick Flights," after one of their prime political sponsors, Rep. Bill McCormick (R-Fla.). The MAC missions played a key humanitarian, diplomatic, and propaganda part in the course of the Soviet-Afghan conflict, and how they came to be is a story in itself.

Between 1979, when the Red Army invaded Afghanistan, and 1989, when its last remnant left, the Soviets and their Afghan puppets killed some one million Afghans and maimed countless more. Five million became refugees, fleeing mostly to Pakistan. From the begin-

ning, the US Central Intelligence Agency worked with Pakistan's intelligence establishment to back the Afghan resistance with supplies of arms and other material. None of this, however, was of much use in treating the war's victims.

In 1984, Mary Spencer-Morin of the conservative Committee for a Free Afghanistan began a campaign to help Afghan wounded get medical care in the US. That same year, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger approved, on a one-time basis, a request to bring back eight *mujahadeen* for treatment at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

As Soviet operations in Afghanistan intensified and the number of Afghan casualties soared, Ms. Spencer-Morin managed to get approval for dozens more wounded Afghans to come to the US for private treatment. The catch was that all had to travel on commercial flights, paid for by Ms. Spencer-Morin with whatever money she could raise.

Meanwhile, Vaughn Forrest, Congressman McCollum's chief of staff, had visited Pakistan and had seen the suffering of Afghan refugees and fighters firsthand. When the Florida lawmaker heard the stories, he came up with the idea of mounting humanitarian missions into neighboring Pakistan. More than a year earlier, a Pentagon Task Force study had recommended centralizing and expanding the military's international humanitarian role, but the idea went nowhere. The Agency for International Development (AID) was already working with refugees in Pakistan, but Representative McCollum claimed that the most immediate need was to provide warm clothes and medicine to the Afghans who remained in their homeland.

In its final version of the 1986 Pentagon budget, Congress approved the Florida Republican's idea. The budget authorized the Pentagon to transport to Pakistan excess non-lethal items, such as sleeping bags, boots, and blankets, to provide to Afghans "displaced" by the war. Representative McCollum and Rep. Charles Wilson (D-Tex.) convinced Congress to appropriate \$10 million to pay for the shipment, which would take place on Military Airlift Command planes.

Though principally humanitarian, the legislation helped the Afghans to hang on and fight the

invasion. Mr. Forrest observes: After a rocky start, the program began to function well. Field workers on the Pakistani-Afghan border soon saw that the operation had greater potential. The Air Force planes, they told Congressmen McCollum and Wilson, had been returning to the US empty; on the return runs they could easily ferry war victims needing surgery or treatment to the United States.

The two lawmakers joined forces with another staunch backer of the Afghan resistance, Sen. Gordon Humphrey (R-N. H.), to push for the idea, and they succeeded. The first patients to come to the US under the military program arrived on March 6, 1986. In a convoluted funding procedure, Pentagon money was passed to AID, which hired the Geneva-based International Organization for Migration (IOM) as a subcontractor. IOM then set up its own Afghan program office in Washington, starting with \$250,000 a year.

IOM's role grew. It is now supposed to help screen the patients, find doctors and hospitals to provide free treatment in the US and western Europe, manage the patients while they are in the United States, and feed and house them while they are not in hospital. IOM's actual policy is to attempt to enlist the aid of volunteers to do these jobs as often as possible. So far, Americans in 100 cities across thirty-eight states have accepted responsibility for the Afghans, often taking them into their homes during their recuperation.

In the program's nearly six years, IOM has brought about 530 Afghans to the United States. Another 500 or so have been treated in western Europe, Canada, Egypt, and Japan.

On these flights, MAC pilots and crews of the twentieth century come face to face with warriors who sometimes seem as though they would be more at home in the thirteenth century. They are the Afghan freedom fighters who fought against modern Soviet forces in one of the most gruesome and vicious wars of this century. On flights into Pakistan, the transports have brought military equipment, goods, and other necessities to the Afghan people. On flights home, they carried the wounded and maimed to Western hospitals.

By Richard Mackenzie

AIR FORCE Magazine / February 1992

Con't from p. 8



Sunny Times  
12/92

A similar article, "Humanitarian Airlift," appeared in the February issue of AIRMAN.

From the Editor:

Each time we get ready to do a Forum we wonder what's going to go in it. We entertain visions of large print & luxurious margins - lovely to look at & somewhat boring to read. But, once again, thanks to many of you, there are items of startling variety; narrow margins & small print, in spite of more pages & some omissions. We continue to be grateful.

We offer Nawroz greetings to our Afghan subscribers, along with the hope that maybe, just maybe, 1371 will be the year that sees some sort of peace in Afghanistan. We hope so.

A casualty of the breakup of the USSR is Bakhtar telexes. Tass doesn't send them any more (or at least the Russian Federation UN Mission doesn't deliver them to the Afghan Mission as in the past). We were addicted to Bakhtar's incredible prose; we'll miss it, but we are thankful for the Kabul Times even though its English doesn't have the color of that refracted by both Persian & Russian translators!

The deadline for the next issue is May 5. We'll hope to hear from you.

## EVENTS

THE MONGOL LEGACY IN CENTRAL & SOUTH ASIA is the topic of a talk to be given by Prof. Robert McChesney on 3/27 at 6:30 pm at the Kevorkian Center, 50 Washington Square South (NY University), NY City, sponsored by the Indo-Mongolian Society.

DISCOVERING AFGHANISTAN in London:



DISCOVERING AFGHANISTAN is London's first festival of Afghan arts and culture. Throughout late March and April the city is host to a wide range of events that will enable you to discover and enjoy the arts, crafts and traditions of this fascinating country.

Following twelve years of war in Afghanistan, many of the country's top artists are now living abroad as refugees, a number of them in London. These artists are among those taking part in DISCOVERING AFGHANISTAN. The festival invites all Londoners to join the capital's Afghan community by participating in workshops and courses and by visiting a range of events including concerts, craft exhibitions, film shows, dance performances, photography, embroidery and an arts and crafts market.

### ♦ FREE EXHIBITIONS ♦

**Afghan Embroidery - Then and Now:** A fascinating look at life in Afghanistan before the war and as it is now, as seen in the contrast between traditional and contemporary uses of embroidery. Courtesy of The Danish Refugee Council, Pip Rau and Kian Velgopudi. The Exhibition Room, Ealing Central Library, Ealing Broadway Centre, London W5 from 1st to 24th April (open normal library hours).

**Arts & Crafts of Afghanistan:** An exhibition celebrating the distinctive artefacts, furnishings and costume of the varied populations of Afghanistan - featuring ceramics, furniture, carpets, kilims and other weavings, embroideries, costumes and jewellery. Joss Graham Oriental Textiles, 10 Eccleston Street, London SW1 from 1st to 25th April.

**Afghanistan - from Resistance to Assistance:** An exhibition of photographs by the charity Afghanaid documenting the destruction suffered by Afghanistan in 12 years of war and the efforts being made by Afghan villagers to rebuild their houses, restore their irrigation systems, and grow food again in their fields. Watemans Arts Centre, Brentford from 3rd to 29th April.

**The Heart of Afghanistan:** Exquisite hand made jewellery including Uzbek and Kazak silver filigree, lapis-lazuli necklaces, and silver pieces inlaid with carnelian, lapis-lazuli and agate. All the contemporary pieces are made by refugees in Peshawar. Marilyn Garrow Gallery, 6 The Broadway, White Hart Lane, Barnes SW13 from 22nd April to 7th May.

Sat 25th April from 6.00pm  
Acton Town Hall, High Street, Acton, London W3

The Spring Party will be the climax to DISCOVERING AFGHANISTAN.

Believe it or not, the Town Hall will be unrecognisable: banners, decorations and festoons will create the perfect setting for celebrating spring in true Afghan style. This will be a night of music, dancing, feasting and festivities, with a special guest appearance by one of Afghanistan's top singers. Early booking advised.

Presented in association with The Society of Afghans Resident in the UK. Proceeds will be donated to the Afghan schools in London.



Funny Times / February 1992

More on p. 2

## LOUIS DUPREE'S AFGHANISTAN

(This is a revision of a paper presented at the Int'l Conference on Afghanistan, sponsored by the Inst. of Oriental Philology, the Polish Ethnological Society & Afghanica in Krakow, Poland, April 4-6, 1991.)

Since his untimely death in 1989, Louis Dupree has been paid numerous tributes: universal praise for the man, his work, & for his love of Afghanistan & its people. He deserves more, especially critical study of his publications &, ultimately, of his unpublished papers & letters, for anyone interested in Afghanistan must take into consideration his voluminous work. It is hoped that this article will encourage others to dip into this rich field.

This study is primarily of Dupree's published writings in the 1970s. It concentrates on his concern for the development of Afghanistan as a modern, progressive nation. He wanted to play a part in that process as an analyst & consultant, as one who would interpret where the society stood & embolden its progression.

I shall comment only briefly on his archaeological work because I have no expertise in that area. However, I believe that the work was very important for Dupree for at least two reasons. First, it established his credentials as a scholar on Afghanistan & assisted him in gaining employment at the Air University in Montgomery, Alabama, & later with the American Universities Field Staff in Afghanistan. Perhaps a second reason was even more important; the field work gave Dupree a sense of the significance of Afghanistan. He discovered that it had been a habitat of man back at least to the Paleolithic Age. That it was in the latitudinal & altitudinal zone where man learned to control his food supply through cultivation of wheat & barley & development of a sheep/goat/cattle complex that eventually led to the beginning of urban civilizations. Through study & field work Dupree came to realize that for millennia Afghanistan had been a crossroad for many peoples & cultures which blended to produce a unique & diverse society. In other words, Afghanistan was an area of international significance, & whatever he could contribute to knowledge about it would be beneficial to other scholars.

Time & time again in his writings Dupree characterized Afghanistan as a peasant-tribal, inward-looking society in which kinship relations defined rights & obligations: a society of farmers & herdsmen; a non-literate society in a land with a great literary heritage; an Islamic society in which the religion of the countryside had become "bastardized" with a mixture of ancient cults & practices & orthodox Muslim philosophy. Those characteristics combined to perpetuate conservatism & obstruct efforts to move the society forward along progressive paths.

In his appraisal of the country's development, Dupree singled out individuals & events that furthered progress. For example, he dated the beginning of modern Afghanistan from the reign of Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901) who, through the practice of "internal imperialism" subdued the tribal khanates & weakened the clan community that was the basis of the kinship-tribal system. Abdur Rahman realized the importance of curbing "all those hundreds of petty chiefs, plunderers, robbers & cutthroats."<sup>1</sup> He organized provincial governments to replace the tribal confederations & thus fostered the national authority.

Another individual whom Dupree believed was an important agent in the country's development was Mahmud Beg Tarzi. Tarzi not only influenced his son-in-law, Amanullah, who reigned from 1919-1929, he also inspired the "Young Afghans" group that promoted constitutional government & modernist Muslim interpretation early in this century.

Dupree recognized that progress in Afghanistan would not occur in a linear fashion but that it would be slow, uneven, & with breaks & reversals along the way. Amanullah's reforms, for example, were too radical for their time & were attempted without a sufficient power base behind the government.

Of more recent developments, Dupree found praiseworthy Moh's Daoud's lifting of purdah in 1959. That provided greater freedom for women & potentially doubled the nation's work force. Dupree was particularly pleased with the constitution of 1964 which he considered "the finest in the Muslim world" <sup>2</sup> &, at the time, "probably the most important event in 20th century Afghanistan." <sup>3</sup> It provided for secular government within an Islamic framework, & through it the instituting of a free press & political parties could be important steps toward developing the articulate opposition that Dupree believed was essential for responsible, representative government. However, to Dupree's disappointment, party legislation never was enacted by King Moh'd Zahir Shah, nor did the king play the positive role in government necessary for leadership & balance. Instead of advancing political development, the constitutional monarchy's ineptness in meeting the demands of modernists & leftists eventually led to stalemate & chaos.

That situation led to Moh'd Daoud's coup of 1973 that created the Republic of Afghanistan. Dupree had predicted that Daoud would reject the place on the political sideline dictated by the 1964 constitution & that he would seek a return to power. However, Dupree did not consider the overthrow of the constitutional monarchy as necessarily a setback in the progressive movement. Previously he had written that dictators & military rule could be advantageous if they continued to move the society ahead progressively. Furthermore, it was a mistake to believe that only Western-style democracy or socialism should be the model for developing nations. (Apparently it was in that light that Dupree evaluated Mao's China as he joined many Afghans in mourning the Chairman's death in 1976.) Certainly he applauded the new constitution of 1977. Under it, Dupree declared,

Afghanistan continued slowly along a path toward a system of self-government...consistent with its cultural patterns. Probably the only nation in the region to deliberately turn its back to Western models, Afghanistan is utilizing its own traditional patterns - the jirgah & the Loya Jirgah - to lay the groundwork for a government based more on the group...than the individual. <sup>4</sup>

Despite an auspicious start for Daoud's republican government, a turning point came in March 1977 with the appointment of a new cabinet. The selection of the same sycophants exasperated the liberals & resulted in the reunion of the leading leftist coalition: the Khalq-Parcham factions of the PDPA. Daoud's support was virtually gone by the summer of 1977. Belatedly he recognized this & planned to broaden his government, but it was too late.

Initially, Dupree was supportive of the PDPA when it seized control in April 1978 & established the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). He admitted that the leaders were self-acknowledged leftists, nevertheless, he insisted that they should be accepted as nationalists rather than as Communist dupes of foreign powers. He supported a number of DRA decrees as being consistent with the progressive interests of the country; for example, women's rights, land reform, & the elimination of usury. However, after observing the DRA's terroristic purges of opposition, Dupree concluded that the regime's concern for its own preservation had overridden its concern for the people. Eventually, he agreed that the DRA reforms were too drastic for the nation's historic & cultural heritage, & that the entire society had been antagonized. Yet, his judgement remained tempered & he stated that "the DRA's socialism may ultimately prove to be another misstep " along the path of progress. <sup>5</sup>

Throughout 1979, while the DRA regime floundered & resistance spread, Dupree believed that the Soviets would realize that it would not be in their best interest to intervene militarily or take over Afghanistan. When they did invade, Dupree correctly forecast that it would result in a bloodbath & genocide. He declared that the Soviets had foolishly engaged in an unwinnable war, as they eventually conceded.

While Louis Dupree never wavered in his conviction that Afghanistan was moving forward, if ever so unevenly, in its quest for liberal, representative government, at least until the DRA aberration became evident, there were several elements about which he had strong prejudices. One of his strongest was his contempt for the bureaucracy: "one of the world's most formidable," he complained, "with generations of built-in, internal controls & inconsistencies." <sup>6</sup> He maintained that the bureaucracy was a detriment to economic & social progress because it resisted virtually every reform effort, fearing a loss of control. Riddled with corruption, one required large amounts of baksheesh to circumvent its morass. To illustrate his point, Dupree related his experience with the Government Monopolies in purchasing liquor. The ordeal extended over 3 days & "took 102 separate steps to purchase the alcohol, & the file, about two inches thick, presumably lies preserved for posterity in the bowels of the Monopolies." <sup>7</sup>

Another element in Afghan society against which Dupree took issue was the conservative religious leadership. He saw its opposition as a hindrance to modernization in matters such as education, women's rights, judicial reform, & birth control. One wonders if that animosity might have originated in an early experience of Dupree's at Deh Morasi Ghundai, where the mullahs stole the prehistoric human remains that had been unearthed & secretly buried them elsewhere. In possibly another version of that episode, Dupree told how he bodily threw a mullah off one of the digs because of his interference with the work.

Dupree also was critical of Afghanistan's reliance on foreign aid because, he feared, with it the nation would never really achieve independence. He argued that the aid usually was too narrow in conception & implementation, & that it failed to give proper consideration to Afghanistan's cultural diversity. As a prime example of misdirected foreign assistance, he cited the Hilmand Valley project that was plagued not only with inadequate drainage, but by the misguided effort to settle nomads on the land.

While Dupree usually was straight-forward in stating his socio-political views, his economic appraisals were ambivalent. In 1970, for example, he praised the tentative swing toward capitalism & declared that, with a more equitable tax system, further investment would be encouraged. Furthermore, in various writings he lauded the achievements of Afghan capitalists including Abdul Habib Aziz, Nashir Ghilzai, & others, & the American, Peter Baldwin. Nevertheless, in the same year that he commended the swing toward capitalism, he warned against too rapid changes in introducing private investment because the nation lacked the attitudes necessary to support it. When Daoud returned to power in 1973 supporting an economy with heavy industry & natural resources under state control & private enterprise limited to light & medium industry, Dupree noted it without comment. In 1977, however, he criticized the current 7-Year-Plan because of its limitations on the private sector's role in national development. But in another switch, Dupree's 1981 recommendations for Muslim countries, including Afghanistan, called for "socioeconomic justice under Islam," that would be, he stated, "in many ways, a 'mixed economy' socialism." <sup>8</sup>

What were Dupree's long-term recommendations for Afghanistan? He concurred with Abdur Rahman's advice about the importance of unity if the country was to be a great power, observing that the key was the involvement of all ethnolinguistic groups & government agencies. Dupree formulated a program for Afghanistan & other Muslim countries & declared that

modernist Islamic principles...offer a middle path...between a Soviet communism becoming more capitalist, & a capitalist world becoming more socialist.... The real question is not whether Islam is adequate for the modern world, but whether the West (including the USSR) will permit Islamic countries to make their own synthesis.<sup>9</sup>

His program stipulated a secular, democratic, constitutional system, with guarantees against anything inimical to any Islamic sect; a foreign policy of nationalism, regional



cooperation, & nonalignment; a mixed economy of socialism; internal localization of power; & reliance on local resources as much as possible. Dupree firmly believed that the ethnolinguistic diversities of Afghanistan were positive institutions that should be used to foster nationalism. He recommended dividing the country into 7 cultural, geographical regions headed by cabinet ministers who would meet weekly in Kabul to establish policy, & then fly back to their regions to implement it.

Above all, he cautioned against rapid change, preferring evolutionary advances. The country had, he argued, "a natural resource which neither its foreign advisors nor its foreign-trained elite will permit it to utilize. That natural resource is time." <sup>10</sup> He also observed, with obvious regret, that "'progress' - or maybe only change - cannot be stopped... Ultimately, national politics intrude on the rural scene, ignoring or distorting but almost never solving the true local & regional problems." <sup>11</sup> Despite Dupree's many arguments for progressive development, his caution here indicates some nostalgia for a conservative Afghanistan. Writing about Nuristan, he mused that there "time almost stands still... The ticking of the clock gives way to the ecological calendar & man, working with nature as a partner, survives & prevails." <sup>12</sup>

In summary, two basic modes, not necessarily exclusive, are identifiable in Dupree's writings about Afghanistan. The first, relatively more objective, more often was used in his American Universities Field Staff Reports that concentrate on depicting Afghanistan as it was. The second, more interpretive, can be found in other publications, in articles such as "The Political Uses of Religion: Afghanistan." <sup>13</sup> & "Democracy & the Military Base of Power." <sup>14</sup>

In his writings Dupree frequently used verbatim portions of articles & reports that he had previously published. This was done quite openly & he usually cited the previous work. He was meticulous in crediting the assistance he received from others. There is considerable humor in his work: of Daoud "playing footsie" with the Soviet Union & the United States; & in titles such as "Taraki in Blunderland," "The Saints Come Marching In," & "Nuristan: 'The Land of Light' Seen Darkly." In his conversation there was an earthiness that was offensive to some; however, as it never appears in his published writing, one wonders if it was not an affectation.

Critical though Dupree often could be of Afghanistan, it was a constructive criticism that he hoped would encourage the development of a modern, liberal nation. As those who knew him will testify, he was a generous man, unstinting of his time & ideas with more than a generation of Afghans & others. He once speculated that

the resident foreign businessman must be motivated by something far beyond the desire for profit; money alone can not compensate him fully for his trials & tribulations as he tries to function in an alien milieu. <sup>15</sup>

Dupree called that mysterious something "the X-factor." I suggest that Louis Dupree did not see the country as an alien milieu, but that he was similarly motivated by his love for Afghanistan & its people.

George W. Collins  
Wichita State University

Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, revised edition (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980), 419.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 565.

<sup>3</sup> Louis Dupree, "The Political Uses of Religion: Afghanistan," in Churches & States: The Religious Institution & Modernization, Kalman H. Silvert, ed., (New York, American Universities Field Staff, 1967), 207.

- 4 Louis Dupree, "Toward Representative Government in Afghanistan. Part II: Steps Six Through Nine - and Beyond," American Universities Field Staff Reports, Asia, 1978/No. 14 (February 1978) [LD-2-78], 7.
- 5 Louis Dupree, "The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, 1979: Rhetoric, Repression, Reforms, and Revolts," *ibid.*, Asia, 1979/No. 32 (September 1979) [LD-1-79], 7.
- 6 Louis Dupree, "Free Enterprise in Afghanistan. Part III: Programs, Problems and Prospects," *ibid.*, South Asia Series, vol. 14, #6 (May 1970) [LD-6-70], 12.
- 7 Louis Dupree, "Afghanistan: 1968. Part I: Government and Bureaucracy." *ibid.*, South Asia Series, vol. 14, #4 (August 1968) [LD-4-68], 6.
- 8 Louis Dupree, "Militant Islam and Traditional Warfare in Islamic South Asia," *ibid.*, Asia, 1980/No. 21 (February 1980) [LD-1-80], 3.
- 9 *Ibid.*, 2.
- 10 Louis Dupree, The New Republic of Afghanistan: The First Twenty-one Months, Afghanistan Council of The Asia Society, Special Paper, Spring 1976, 10.
- 11 Louis Dupree, "Militant Islam and Traditional Warfare," *op. cit.*, 9.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 2.
- 13 Louis Dupree, "The Political Uses of Religion," *op. cit.*, 195-212.
- 14 Louis Dupree, "Democracy and the Military Base of Power," Middle East Journal 22 (1968), 29-44.
- 15 Louis Dupree, "Free Enterprise in Afghanistan. Part II: Peter Baldwin and Indamer Industries, Inc.," AUFS Reports, South Asia Series, vol. 14, #4 (February 1970 [LD-4-70]), 1.

---



---

## FOOD

The Robert Devenney's write that the KABUL RESTAURANT, 106 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106 (215-922-3676), has a pleasant atmosphere and good food. It opened last summer.

There is a KABUL RESTAURANT at 1153 East Jerico Turnpike, just west of Park Avenue, Huntington, Long Island, NY (516-549-5506). According to the 2/9 New York Times

Dissonant Afghani music sets the tone, as do the hanging lamps of leather and macramé. Walls are a mix of stucco, bricks and mirrors. They are adorned with handmade rugs, tassels, woven baskets and travel posters.

The tables are covered in native tapestries, and the large wood chairs with rush seats are made comfortable with colorful cushions. Candlelight flickers from every table.

Service is sweet and speedy. One young man, who comes from Kabul, is fluent in English and helps with menu choices. The rest of the staff smiles a lot and understands requests for more water and yogurt sauce.

The AFGHAN VILLAGE RESTAURANT opened last April at 5 St. Mark's Place, New York, NY 10003 (212-979-6453), and bills itself as the best Afghan restaurant in New York. "Special decoration & design of the Afghan Village Restaurant provides an atmosphere with which the patrons finds it much different than any other Easter (sic) Cuisine in the city." And they use only cholesterol-free vegetable shortening.

There is a new PAMIR RESTAURANT in New York City at 59th Street & 1st Avenue. We have only seen the canopy from the bus window but we'll hope to have a report for the next issue.

---

Men are mountains and women are the levers  
that move them. —Afghanistan

# DISSERTATIONS

FROM: Frank Joseph Shulman, Compiler and Editor.  
DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS ON ASIA: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHICAL JOURNAL OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH, vol.14, nos.1 & 2 (Winter/Summer 1991)

BABURI, Mohammed Haider.

*Die Entwicklung und Vervollkommnung des volkswirtschaftlichen Planungssystems in Afghanistan und die Auswertung von Erfahrungen der DDR auf diesem Gebiet.* [German: The Development and Improvement of the System of National Economic Planning in Afghanistan and the Assessment of the Experiences of the German Democratic Republic in this Domain.] Hochschule für Ökonomie "Bruno Leuschner", 1987 (Dissertation A). Various pagings. For copies, write to the Bibliothek, Hochschule für Ökonomie, Hermann-Duncker-Str. 8, 0-1157 Berlin, Germany.

BALI, Anila.

*The Russo-Afghan Boundary Demarcation, 1884-95: Britain and the Russian Threat to the Security of India.* Ulster, 1986 (Ph.D. in History). 616p. DAI 51, no.9 (Mar. 1991): 3186-A; Copies available through the British Library Document Supply Centre, Boston Spa, Wetherby, West Yorkshire LS23 7BQ, United Kingdom, accession no. DSC:DX91315.

BENNETT, Andrew Owen.

*Theories of Individual, Organizational, and Governmental Learning and the Rise and Fall of Soviet Military Interventionism, 1973-1983.* Harvard, 1990 (Ph.D. in Public Policy). 485p. DAI 51, no.7 (Jan. 1991): 2502-A; UM 9035597. See chapter 5 (pp.263-356): "Stated Soviet Beliefs on Military Intervention 1976-1979 and Soviet Behavior in Afghanistan 1978-1980."

COLDITZ, Eric.

*Zur Rolle traditioneller Kapitalformen bei Genese industriellen Kapitals in Afghanistan.* [German: On the Role of Traditional Forms of Capital in the Formation of Industrial Capital in Afghanistan.] Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 1989 (Dissertation A). iv, 219, 12p. For copies, write to the Universitätsbibliothek, Humboldt-Universität, Clara-Zetkin-Str. 27, 0-1086 Berlin, Germany.

DARMEL, Rahim Jan.

*Die Herausbildung der sozialistischen Produktionsverhältnisse in der Landwirtschaft Afghanistans.* [German: The Development of Socialist Conditions of Production in Afghan Agriculture.] Halle, 1985 (Dissertation A, Fakultät des Rechts- und Wirtschaftswissenschaftens). 174p. & appendix. For copies, write to the Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt, Martin-Luther-Universität, August-Bebel-Strasse 13, 0-4010 Halle, Germany.

de BENOIST, Augustin.

*La composition des ménages nomades afghans d'après les données du recensement d'Afghanistan de mai 1979.* [French: The Composition of Afghan Nomadic Households According to Census Data from Afghanistan of May 1979.] Paris V (René Descartes), 1984 (Doctorat de 3<sup>e</sup> cycle en sociologie). For copies, write to the Bibliothèque de l'Université de Paris V, 10, avenue Pierre-Larousse, 92240 Malakoff, France.

DILLMANN, Olaf Otto.

*Rugose Korallen aus dem Perm Afghanistans unter Berücksichtigung einer Fauna aus dem Perm von Kreta.* [German: Rugose Corals from the Permian Period of Afghanistan with Particular Consideration of One Fauna from the Permian Period in Crete.] Münster, 1987 (Dr.). 176, xii p. For copies, write to the Universität Münster, Universitätsbibliothek, W-4400 Münster, Germany.

FERRE, Guy.

*Activités de l'Aide médicale internationale (AMI) en Afghanistan 1980-1985: contraintes de l'exercice médical dans un pays traditionnel en guerre; à propos d'une mission dans le Ba Myan, 1985.* [French: Activities of the Organization "International Medical Assistance" in Afghanistan, 1980-1985: Constraints on Medical Training in a Traditional Country at War; With Regard to a Mission in Bamian, 1985.] Strasbourg I, 1986 (Doctorat d'Etat en médecine). 135p. For copies, write to the Bibliothèque Nationale et Universitaire de Strasbourg, Section Médecine, 4, rue Kirschleger, 67085 Strasbourg cedex, France.

GOODSON, Larry Preston.

*Refugee-Based Insurgency: The Afghan Case.* North Carolina (Chapel Hill), 1990 (Ph.D. in Political Science). 439p. DAI 51, no.7 (Jan. 1991): 2511-A; UM 9034704. A case study of the Afghan War, 1978-1989.

KAIUMI, Abdul Samad.

*Perspektivy razvitiia shkol'nogo obrazovaniia v Respublike Afganistan.* [Russian: Prospects for the Development of School Education in the Republic of Afghanistan.] Nauchno-issledovatel'skii institut obshchestvennoi pedagogiki Akademii pedagogicheskikh nauk SSSR, 1988 (Kandidat nauk in Pedagogical Sciences).

KAMRAN, Mohammed Hassan.

*Ökonomische Erfordernisse und Möglichkeiten für die extensive und intensive Erweiterung der Pflanzenproduktion in der Landwirtschaft der Republik Afghanistan.* [German: Economic Requirements and Possibilities for the Extensive and Intensive Enlargement of Plant Production in Agriculture within the Republic of Afghanistan.] Leipzig, 1989 (Dissertation A). Various pagings. For copies, write to the Universität Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, Beethovenstrasse 6, 0-7010 Leipzig, Germany.

LOBINGIER, John Huston.

*Nationality Policy and Practice toward Minorities in the Russian and Soviet Armed Forces.* Catholic University of America, 1989 (Ph.D. in Politics). 295p. DAI 50, no.4 (Oct. 1989): 1078-A; UM 8912979. See pp.199-203: "Policy Effects in the Military: The Central Asian in War-time Afghanistan."

MOHSENZADA, Ghulam Mohammad.

*Die Rolle der afghanischen Jugend im Kampf für die revolutionäre Umgestaltung Afghanistans.* [German: The Role of Afghan Youth in the Struggle for the Revolutionary Transformation of Afghanistan.] Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 1985 (Dissertation A, Wissenschaftlicher Rat). iv, 122p. For copies, write to the Universitätsbibliothek, Humboldt-Universität, Clara-Zetkin-Str. 27, 0-1086 Berlin, Germany.

OHLENDORF, Helga Meta Else.

*Genetic Studies of Resistance to Rhizobium leguminosarum in Pisum sativum.* Uppsala [Sweden], 1986 (Dr.). DAI 49, no.1 (Spring 1988): Section C—entry no.49/198c. Concerned in part with disease resistant plants originating from Afghanistan. Summary published as *Genetic Studies of Resistance to Rhizobium leguminosarum in Pisum sativum* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1986. 26p. [Comprehensive summaries of Uppsala dissertations from the Faculty of Science, 53]).

OMAR, Assad.

*Die russisch-afghanischen Beziehungen von der ersten russischen Gesandtschaft 1878/79 nach Afghanistan bis zum sowjetischen Einmarsch in Afghanistan am 27.12.1979.* [German: Russian-Afghan Relations from the First Russian Mission (1878-79) to Afghanistan to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan on December 12, 1979.] Freie Universität Berlin, 1987 (Dr.). Published as *Die russisch-afghanischen Beziehungen von der ersten russischen Gesandtschaft 1878/79 nach Afghanistan bis zum sowjetischen Einmarsch in Afghanistan am 27.12.1979* (Frankfurt: Lang, 1987. 216p. [Europäische Hochschulschriften: Reihe 31, Politikwissenschaften, Bd.105]).

PITTMAN, Avril Angela.

*The Federal Republic of Germany's Political Relations with the USSR, 1974-1982.* Lancaster, 1989 (Ph.D. in Politics). 280p. AB: Aslib. Index to Theses with Abstracts Accepted for Higher Degrees by the Universities of Great Britain and Ireland, vol.39, pt.4, entry no.39-8454. Also DAI 50, no.12 (June 1990): 4091-A. Copies available through the British Library Document Supply Centre, Boston Spa, Wetherby, West Yorkshire LS23 7BQ, United Kingdom, accession no. DSC:DX88270. Contains some information about Germany's opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

POLI, Xavier.

*Ne tirez pas sur le vaccinateur: vaccination anti rougeoleuse en Afghanistan dans le province du Wardak.* [French: Don't Fire upon the Vaccinator: Vaccination against Measles in the Province of Wardak, Afghanistan.] Aix-Marseille II, 1986 (Doctorat d'Etat en médecine). 142p. For copies, write to the Bibliothèque de l'Université d'Aix-Marseille II, Section Médecine, Chemin des Bourrely, 13326 Marseille cedex 15, France.

ROBERTS, Jeffery John.

*Afghanistan and Western Policy: 1929-1956.* Ohio State, 1990 (Ph.D. in History). 502p. DAI 51, no.7 (Jan. 1991): 2496-A; UM 9031137. Examines Afghanistan's strategic relations with Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, particularly with reference to India and Pakistan.

RAO, Pradeep Singh.

*Afghanistan Problem with Reference to Indian Foreign Policy.* Ravishankar, 1989 (Ph.D.). 312p. For copies, write to the Library, Ravishankar University, Raipur, Madhya Pradesh 492002, India. A copy is also available at the Indian Council of Social Science Research, National Social Science Documentation Centre, 35 Ferozeshah Road, New Delhi 110001, India.

SCHMIDT, Carolyn Woodford.

*Bodhisattva Headdresses and Hairstyles in the Buddhist Art of Gandhāra and Related Regions of Swāt and Afghanistan.* Ohio State, 1990 (Ph.D. in History of Art). 1121p. DAI 51, no.10 (Apr. 1991): 3260-A; UM 9031143. Detailed typological studies together with appendixes that include several hundred Bodhisattva images and additional support materials.

SHAFEE, Mohammad.

*Die langfristige und planmäßige Entwicklung des Schulnetzes in der Demokratischen Republik Afghanistan unter schöpferischer Nutzung der Erkenntnisse und Erfahrungen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.* [German: The Long-Term, Systematic Development of the School System in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan through the Creative Utilization of the Knowledge and Experience of the German Democratic Republic.] Akademie der Pädagogischen Wissenschaften der DDR, 1987 (Dissertation A). 147, 39, 19p. For copies, write to the Pädagogische Zentralbibliothek, Akademie der Pädagogischen Wissenschaften, Alexanderpl. Haus des Lehrers, 0-1020 Berlin, Germany.

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS

THE AFGHAN STUDIES JOURNAL, Vol. 2, 1990-1991, Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska, Omaha. Nake M Kamrany, Guest Editor. Articles include "Soviet War Liabilities: Measuring Economic Damages in Afghanistan" by N.M. Kamrany; "The Soviet Decision to Invade Afghanistan: A Legal Basis for Soviet Liability" by N.M. Kamrany & D.T. Killion; "The Economic Costs of Afghanistan & The Decision to Withdraw" by Tad Daley; "The Two Faces of Habibullah Kalakani" by Ludwig Adamec; "Trees & Women: A Pilot Project" by Kathryn Kaldor; "Challenges of Planning for Education In Afghanistan" by R.N. Cowell; "Peace Corps Volunteers in Afghanistan" by Susan Aronson, "The Afghan Oral History Project" by S. Wahab & G. Fawcett; "Afghanistan Goes to the Movies" by Robert Nash.

"Holy War Without End" by Mark Bauman & Markos Kounalakis in the LOS ANGELES TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 23.

UNTYING THE AFGHAN KNOT - Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal, by Riaz M. Khan, an Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Book, Duke University Press, Durham & London, 1991. 401 pp., appendices, notes, index. \$49.95. ISBN 0-8223-1155-0.

AFTER THE WARS - Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Central America, Indochina, The Horn of Africa, & Southern Africa. US Third-World Policy Perspectives #16. The chapter on Afghanistan is by Selig Harrison. Overseas Development Council, 1990. 240 pp. \$15.95 (paper). ISBN 0-88738-880-9. Available from Transaction Publishers, Dept. ASI, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903.

More volumes of the ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM are available from E.J. Brill, 24 Hudson Street, Kinderhook, NY 12106. Fascicule 120, Mughals to Muhammad, is \$23. Fascicule 121-122 is \$37.25. There is a simultaneous French edition also.

SILENT SOLDIER: THE MAN BEHIND THE AFGHAN JEHAD, GEN. AKHTAR ABDUR RAHMAN SHAHEED by Moh'd Yousaf, Jang, Lahore, 1991. 106 pp., map, photos.

WÉDÂ 20 ANS CELLULE 5 KABOUL by Wédâ Pédari & Serge de Beaurecueil, J.C. Lattès. 270 pp. 119 Ff.

BETWEEN TWO GIANTS: POLITICAL HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN IN THE 19TH CENTURY by Sayed Qassem Reshtia, Afghan Jihad Works Translation Centre, Peshawar, 1990. 443 pp., photos, maps.

REGIME CHANGE IN AFGHANISTAN, FOREIGN INTERVENTION & THE POLITICS OF LEGITIMACY by Amin Saikal & William Maley, Crawford House Press, Bathurst, 1991. Viii + 190 pp.

INDEX ISLAMICUS 1981-1985: A Bibliography of Books & Articles on the Muslim World, compiled & edited by C. J. Roper at the Cambridge University Library, London, Mansell, 1991. 2 Vols., xliii + 1347 pp. \$165. ISBN 0-7201-2009-8. "There is a large section on Afghanistan & the Pathans, with sub-sections on geography & travel, anthropology, ethnography, folklore

sociology & demography, history, economics, politics & current affairs (including military & strategic studies & law), & Pashto literature."

DIRECTORY OF AFGHAN NGOs, Peshawar, 1991. A joint voluntary project of Afghan NGOs with an introduction by Jane Thomas. This 82-page book gives data on the administration & activities of 33 Afghan NGOs. All but 3 are based in Peshawar; two are in Quetta & 1 in Islamabad. The book has a list of addresses as well as numerous photographs.

WAFA (Loyalty) is the name of a new fortnightly newspaper in Dari & Pashtu published by WUFA, the Writers' Union of Free Afghanistan. Issue #1 of the 4-page publication appeared in November 1991.

POWER STRUGGLE IN THE HINDU KUSH: AFGHANISTAN (1978-1991) by Kamal Matinuddin, Wajidalis, Lahore, 1991. ix + 377 pp., maps, photos.

THE FUTURE OF ISLAMIC AFGHANISTAN, 3rd Seminar: Education in the Future Society of Afghanistan (in Dari), Cultural Council of Afghanistan Resistance, Islamabad, 1991. 470 pp., illus.

DES ETHNIES AUX NATIONS EN ASIA CENTRALE, compiled by Olivier Roy, Edition Diffusion, Editions Edisud, Aix-en-Provence, Jan., 1992. ISBN 2-85744-519-X. Articles about Afghanistan are "Ethnies et Politique en Asia Centrale" by Olivier Roy & "Exil, Relations Interethniques et Identite dans la Crise Afghane" by Pierre Centlivres.

BALUCHISTAN (Pakistan) - ITS SOCIETY, RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT by Akhtar Husain Siddiqi, University Press of America, 4720-A Boston Way, Lanham, MD 20706. August 1991. 346 pp. ISBN 0-8191-8226-5. \$38.50.

AFGHANISTAN: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, edited by Suroosh Irfani & Fazal-ur-Rahman, Inst. of Strategic Studies, F-5/2 Islamabad, Pakistan. 156 pp. \$6 (paper). The book is based on papers presented by Pakistani, Afghan & German analysts at a seminar held in Islamabad. The meetings were sponsored by the Current Affairs Inst. of Pakistan & the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

## BOOK REVIEWS

AFGHANISTAN: FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM, Mir Tamim Ansary. New York: Dillon Press/Mac-Millan Publishing Co., 1991. 127 pp., illus., biblio., index. ISBN 0-87518-482-0. \$14.95. (Discovering our heritage series).

Mir Tamim Ansary has searched his childhood memories for the best of life in Afghanistan; he has also done a thorough job of researching the unhappy years since 1978. The result is a child-centered view of the land and the people, from early history to the present. A quick review of the chapters:

- A War-Torn Land: topography, ethnic groups and languages, "the ones who move," farming and handicrafts (kahrez, karakul and lapis lazuli), the city of Kabul, the refugees and the Islamic parties.
- The Afghan Way of Life: hospitality; the pillars of Islam; dress and beards; literature and the arts (Khalilullah Khalili and Ahmad Zahir).

The war has tossed the Afghan way of life into the air like a deck of cards. How the cards will land when the war fades, no one knows. Life will be different, of course, and everybody knows it. Afghans only hope it will have some of the easygoing, life-loving qualities of the past. (p. 35)
- Crossroads of Conquest: the history of conflict and struggle in Afghanistan, to the present day.
- A Society of Storytellers: a loving account of a story told by the author's grandmother, K'koh; Mullah Nasruddin; Leilah and Majnun; Jinns.
- Festive Days: Nowroz and a recipe for haft miwa (seven fruits); Eid-i-Qurban and Eid-e-Ramazan; weddings.
- Within the Compound Walls: the role of walls in separating the begana (stranger) from the family; the laqub (family nickname); visiting ("Afghans spend a lot of time just keeping one another company") and eating; recipes for qabuli dumpukht, burauni and firni.
- The Struggle for Education: the mullah schools; government schools; classroom atmosphere; role of the kiftan, rote learning; essay-writing; exam days; refugee schools.
- Games and Sports: Children's games: chishm putukan, wishbone memory game, bujul-bazi (with sheep knucklebones); top danda, egg-fighting; pigeon-play; kite-fighting (with glassed string); buzkashi.
- Afghans in America: Waheed Asim (the pizza champion); Yosuf Dollha Joffrey and son; Ustad Humayun Etemadi; starting over, crosscultural conflict in the family; isolation of older women ("They have too much time and nothing to do"); volunteer organizations; the Ariana School for Afghans; new Americans.

Although listed as "juvenile literature," this book is recommended for anyone who wants a glimpse of the inner world of the Afghans. It is particularly helpful for Afghan adults learning English, and for their children, who missed the experience of growing up in their native land.

Shirley Taraki  
Evanston, Illinois



HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF AFGHANISTAN (Asian Historical Dictionaries, 5), Ludwig W. Adamec. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1991. 376 pp. ISBN 0-8108-2491-4.

The Scarecrow Press has updated its series of Asian Historical Dictionaries and once again Afghanistan is featured. The earlier edition, Historical & Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan by M.J. Hanifi, appeared in 1976. This new edition is by Ludwig W. Adamec, Prof. of Near Eastern Studies at the University of Arizona in Tucson.

It is comforting to be still reading Prof. Adamec's contributions to Afghan studies since other prominent authors regretfully have disappeared from the Afghan scene because of death (i.e., Louis Dupree) or other pursuits (i.e. Vartan Gregorian). For this reviewer, serious and accessible writing on Afghanistan began in 1950 with Afghanistan, A Study in Political Developments in Central Asia by W.K. Fraser-Tytler (Oxford University Press, London), crossed the Atlantic in the 1960s and culminated in 1973 with the publication of Afghanistan by Louis Dupree (Princeton University Press). Ludwig Adamec clearly is part of this period, starting with his Afghanistan 1900-1923, A Diplomatic History (University of California Press, Berkeley), and continuing with work on Afghanistan's foreign relations with Germany, Britain, the USSR; his Who's Whos, and his ambitious, encyclopedic, 6-volume reference work, Historical and Political Gazetteer of Afghanistan (Akademische, Druck-u., Verlagsanstalt, Graz).

But back to the Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, the subject of this review. In his "User's Notes" introduction, Prof. Adamec advises that this work is "not definitive in scope." Well, excuse me, please, but I beg to differ. It is definitive in scope and will remain so for both the general and serious reader until it is updated again sometime early in the next century, when recovery in Afghanistan is well under way.

The first entry, appropriately enough, is "Abdali," the original name of the Durrani tribe of the Pashtoon nation and giver of all the royal houses of modern Afghanistan. The Durrani dynasties lasted from 1747 until 1973 when the Musaheban (also known as the Yahya-Khel) family dynasty (members of the Mohammadzai clan of the Barakzai subdivision) was peacefully overthrown by Moh'd Daoud Khan (1st cousin & brother-in-law of Afghanistan's last king, Moh'd Zahir Shah). Daoud proclaimed a republic with himself as president. His presidential "reign" ended in 1978 with the Saur Revolution. And so began another People's Republic - the last to be established as Marxism-Leninism was about to enter its period of public discreditation.

The last entry is "Ziyarat" which Adamec describes as the tomb of a pir which has become a place of pilgrimage. There are now many such ziyarats throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan's NWFP, the graves of mujahids as well as pirs. Their flags flutter in the harsh continental sunlight.

In between there are references to both old and new players - both tribal & individual. References to the period following the overthrow of the Republic in 1978 indicate careful recent investigation. Cross references abound, especially tribal ones; a big help with an often confusing subject. For example, "Ghilzai" and "Hotakis" are mutually referenced with the final observation under the former heading that for the first time since 1747, power appeared to pass from the Durrani to the Ghilzai tribe in 1978. Adamec gives examples.

Adamec is evenhanded in giving biographical data. For example, Dr. Shah Wali, who was Hafizullah Amin's Minister of Health and acting Minister of Foreign Affairs until the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Amin didn't survive but Shah Wali did, although imprisoned for 10 long years. He was appointed Minister Without Portfolio in 1990; he was remembered. We must all remind ourselves that not all communists ate babies for breakfast if and when the final day of reckoning for them arrives. Honor, as well as injustice, rides upon no ideological label. We must judge ourselves by our individual actions, not by our beliefs. This is going to be a hard and bitter lesson for Afghans to learn, but ultimately it will be their salvation and source of political

## DISCOVERING AFGHANISTAN

Continued from p. 1.

The best way to enjoy this festival and to discover Afghan culture is to get involved. With this in mind the organisers invite you to participate in a series of courses and workshops, and even to become involved in the running of the festival itself. Full information on the ways of getting involved are available from Frances or Eva at the Festival Office, 081 809 7960 (2pm-6pm, Monday-Friday). The courses and workshops on offer are as follows:

**Music workshops:** 4 sessions with Aziz Herawi, Asef Mahmood and John Bailey, commencing 18th March at the Abbey Community Centre. Bring any instrument, learn the basics of Afghan music, and recreate the sound of the Radio Afghanistan Orchestra.

**Cookery course:** 5 sessions with Rahima Amin, commencing 20th March at Ken Lo's Kitchen. The taste of Afghan food is delicate and spicy, its aromas unforgettable. Learn to prepare a range of dishes - from banquets to barbecues, simple meals and scented sweets. And taste them!

**Embroidery course:** 4 sessions with Sheila Paine and Imrana Khanum, commencing 1st April at Jess Graham Oriental Textiles. Afghanistan has one of the richest embroidery traditions in the world with a wealth of regional styles. Find out about the fascinating designs and stitches of the Turkomen, Uzbeks, Baluchis and Hazaras, in sessions which will include you putting them into practice.

**Aspects of Traditional Design:** 4 sessions which include demonstrations of Afghan weaving and carpet-making, commencing end of March at various venues. Plus a unique opportunity to visit the London warehouse of the Nawrozadeh family, who pioneered the first ever weaving centre in Kabul, and have been making silk rugs in traditional Harachi, Caucasian and Beshir designs for many years.

**Flamingo workshop:** With Ali Pretty on 16th & 17th April at Watermans Arts Centre. Hands-on sessions painting banners in true Afghan style, to be displayed at the Afghan Fair and the Spring Party. Ring us now to join the team!

**Dance workshop:** With Asef Mahmood, Katherine St. John and Lloyd Miller on 3rd April at the Abbey Community Centre. Circle dances, solo dances and the world-famous Atan - all these and more can be tried.

**Poetry Evening:** An evening for poets and lovers of the mystical and romantic verse of Afghanistan and Persia. (In Pashto and Dari). With music and tea at the KUFA Gallery on 9th April.

**Saturday 18th and Sunday 19th April**  
**Watermans Arts Centre, High Street, Brentford**

During the Easter holiday weekend, part of Watermans Arts Centre will be transformed into an Afghan Bazaar. FREE to the public. Street stalls selling carpets, jewellery, textiles, spices, clothes and many other items will be competing for space with musicians giving impromptu performances, demonstrations and a restaurant with aromatic traditional dishes. Other events over the weekend include:

**Concert by Aziz Herawi:** A rare opportunity to hear Afghan music at its best. Aziz Herawi, visiting Britain for the first time from the USA where he currently lives as a refugee, is a virtuoso of *rubab* and *dutar*. He will be joined by the eminent *tabla* player Asef Mahmood with John Bailey (*rubab*) and Veronica Doubleday (vocals). The New York Times recently said of Herawi: "his playing was about abandon and ecstasy, with intense sections of improvising - always grounded in a galloping rhythm". (Sunday 19th April, 8pm)

**Film:** "Amir", shot in Peshawar in 1985, is a powerful and revealing documentary on the life and conditions of Afghan musicians in the refugee camps. Dir. John Bailey. (3pm, both days)

**Lunchtime concerts:** Traditional and new music performed by London-based Afghan musicians (12.30pm, both days). On Saturday 18th April at 1.30pm, children from London's Afghan schools will join the musicians with songs and dances.

**Arts & crafts demonstrations:** At various times over the weekend Afghan craftsmen will give demonstrations of traditional weaving and carpet-making.

**Afghan Food:** Varied and deliciously spicy. Afghan meals and snacks will be on sale throughout the weekend.

### AFGHANAID PLANT-A-TREE RAFFLE

Help Afghanaid buy fruit trees to replant the war damaged orchards. Help buy poplar trees to build new houses. Great prizes to be won! Grand Draw at the Afghan Spring Party on 25th April. Tickets on sale at some festive events and from Afghanaid on 071 278 2832. Promoter: Howard Lake, Afghanaid, 292 Pentonville Road, London N1 9NR.

## OPPORTUNITIES IN TAJIKISTAN

Temporary teaching positions in English, practical economics, accounting, finance, int'l trade law & other related business courses.

For information, contact Eden Naby, 413-245-3630.

The rewards, according to Eden, include a comfortable, furnished, centrally located apartment with all utilities, including telephone; an exciting & progressive work environment in a private industrial educational institution; ruble salary sufficient to meet local costs; opportunity for travel in the region and, of course, the chance to improve your Russian, Tajik or Uzbek.

Now you can join an expedition & learn about historical sites & the wild but beautiful nature in Tajikistan. In 1992, prehistoric investigations will be led by Prof. V.A. Ranov from May to October. Another expedition will continue excavations on the site of a Greek temple complex on the Amu Darya at Takht-i Sangin, probably where the treasure of the Oxus in the British Museum came from. This expedition will excavate from Sept. to Dec. To join one of these adventures, write Prof. Rahim Masov, Director, Inst. of Archaeology & History, Academy of Sciences, 33 ul. Rudaki, 734001 Dushanbe, Tajikistan. For general information, contact Prof. Richard Frye at 413-245-3630

Should you find yourself in Dushanbe needing housing, Siyakoh Rentals offers fully furnished apartments for rent by the week or by the month. Contact Central Asian Enterprises, P.O. Box 139, Brimfield, MA 01010 (413 - 245-3630). There are special rates for scholars.



The Muslim 3/1/92

maturity in the years to come. Afghanistan yearns to be left alone, to pursue its own destiny. Whatever that destiny is we do not know and it really is none of our business so long as the stability of Afghanistan's neighbors is not directly threatened. Afghanistan needs peace in order to recover from 15 years of foreign invasion and civil war. It must summon the courage this time to be less dependent on others for its political, economic and administrative development in the coming years.

It has been a pleasure for me to read the Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan and a delight to review because it is so inclusive and informative. I thank Prof. Adamec for his latest illumination.

John W. Hennessey  
Medical Advisory Board  
Int'l Rescue Committee's Pakistan  
Program for Afghan Refugees

Waqf in Central Asia: Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 1480-1889, R.D. McChesney. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991. xx + 356pp., 3 maps. ISBN 0-691-05584-7.

The subject of the legal institution of waqf endowment is as old as Islam. It is as current as the government/clerical dialogue in the economic crisis of post-Soviet Central Asia or Pakistan's controversy (inside and outside the Commission on the Islamicization of the Economy) over legal definition of the nation's Islamic character. Through a millenium and across half the world, waqf has provided individuals with a means of defining the use and disposal of property. Whether concerned with the family's economic security or expressing piety, altruism, or idealism, the testator has found at the heart of his culture a means of coping with a changeable, arbitrary civil government and managing the threat of economic and social dislocation (p. 38; Kakar, pp. 31-32). Inevitably, waqf could also be exploited by the adroit and entrepreneurial and provide a focus for competition among local elites (Lambton, p. 113). The practice of waqf in a given Islamic or Muslim-ruled society illustrates that society's distinctive interplay among civil administrator, cleric, and property owner under the persistent realities of the base economy and erratic impositions of civil or military administrations. A study of waqf touches on all the factors that surround it: family and property laws and customs, fiscal administration at the local level and policy (if any), clerical organization and competition, local power structures, and regional economic history (production and landholding patterns, productivity trends).

Prof. McChesney's book gathers the scattered handful of primary documents currently available which relate to the shrine dedicated to 'Ali b. Abu Talib at Mazar i Sharif. These are analyzed and placed in the context (itself somewhat fragmentary) of the local history of the Balkh region as provided by the annalistic historians through the Shaibanid and Yuqay-Timurid regimes. The initial endowment of the shrine by Sultan Husayn Bayqara is shown to be solidly rooted in Central Asian devotionism toward the al-bayt (p.33). In a decentralized political milieu (characterized by "steppe" and clan orientation, pp. 47ff.), the shrine establishment assisted social, economic, and cultural coherence and developed toward political autonomy, even as long-term trends toward commercial decline and drift from irrigated agriculture to pastoralism reshaped the region. The administration and landholdings of the shrine are discussed to the limited extent the documents allow. The often obscure history of the Ansari lineage of administrators (who established a monopoly on the income of the waqf) and the succession from the Ni'mati to the 'Azizi branch of the family is also pursued (pp. 246ff., 307ff.).

This drawing together of sources provides a fairly continuous view of northern Afghanistan up to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman's edict of 1889. With the central government's specification of the shrine's budget, offices, and salaries (and the example of the seizure

of waqf property elsewhere), the stage was set for a serious effort at political "modernization" a la late Qajar Iran - i.e., the manipulation of the religious establishment as a tool for promoting the central regime and its policies (Kakar, pp. 54, 75-76, 154; Bayat, pp. 14-15).

Waqf lends itself to several modes of comparative study: within fairly homogeneous Muslim societies, within Muslim-dominated societies, and across cultures in time or space - the role of temple institutions in local economic organization and social competition (e.g., Buddhist institutions in the Far East). In the first category, Prof. McChesney delineates the decentralized pattern of Muslim Central Asia and so provides a valuable contrast to the history of the centralizing regimes of the Ottoman empire and Safavid and Qajar Iran. It would be interesting to compare this same pattern with an example of category two - the Delhi sultanate (the Mughal empire itself presumably adhered mainly to the Safavid model), but systematic documentation remains to be done (perhaps Tirmizi's recent book is a harbinger).

The third category leads, among other paths, to the "continuity and change" theme. While "the institution of waqf is essentially Islamic" (Lambton, p. 230), the continuation of laws and customs relating to taxation, land holding, and water management from the Sasanian period into and beyond the caliphates is well attested. Sasanian law was firmly established in the empire's economic heartland, Mesopotamia (as reflected by the Syriac lawbooks, other Christian literature, and the Talmud). The surviving Middle Persian collection of case law, the Anthology of 1,000 Decisions (mādiyān ī hazār dādistan) is a compilation dealing with those subjects of most relevance to the diminishing Zoroastrian community in early Islamic times - the continuity of property and the perpetuation of the family. It cannot be proved as a direct or immediate source of waqf regulations; but the concerns, details, and even procedures of these formulations are in harmony with the Hanafite futuwa (Menasce; cf. Baillie, pp. 557ff.).

The Sasanian kingship was rooted in its priestly responsibilities in Fars, and its ascendancy to empire in the third century brought an expansion and formalization of the Zoroastrian clerical class from Mesopotamia to Afghanistan. The establishment or reorganization of endowed fire temples by the outstanding clerical bureaucrat Kirdēr would have facilitated and stimulated the development of a body of endowment law. For the Zoroastrian infrastructure, with some degree of bureaucratic autonomy, could serve as a mediating force between the central despotism and the family head (kadagxwadāy). The latter occupied a position not unlike that of his Muslim descendant. He was concerned with performing meritorious works and perpetuating his family (not separate subjects in his thought). But the productivity of real property, in the long run, created a risk from a central government whose priorities dictated aggrandizement or subordination of property and abasement of the currency. The risk could be mitigated through a precisely documented endowment of religious rites and transmission of the role of economic head of the family (sardārīh and stūrīh). The symbiotic relationship of cleric and property owner is summed up in the legal phrase "to dedicate property for (the benefit of) one's soul. (xwāstag ruwān ī xwēš rāy paydag kardan, Menasce, p. 10). And directly from the Sasanian period the frequent stamp seal inscription ruwān rāy "for the soul" speaks with even greater immediacy. Father de Menasce has pointed out, cautiously enough, the common concern of waqf and sardārīh with continuity of family property (p. 62), and he finds it fitting that the Arab historian al-Khwarazmi glossed the name of the Sasanian Bureau of Spiritual Affairs (dīwan-i ruwānakān with the Arabic kitāba al awqāf (p. 62).

The documents regarding the 'Alid shrine (with their various addenda, signatures, and seals) do not drop neatly into available slots in the annals, and the technical terminology they contain is not fully resolved. Thus any additions to this genre from the Central Asian republics would provide a useful comparison. Prof. McChesney refers to documents which repose in the shrine treasury (p. 297); and, now more than

ever, it would be appropriate if an Afghan scholar could supply from these some more of the still incomplete history of one of Afghanistan's tenacious institutions.

C.J. Brunner  
Hoboken, N.J.

# REFERENCES

- |         |   |         |  |
|---------|---|---------|--|
| Baillie | Neil B.E. Baillie, <u>A Digest of Moohummadan Law</u> . Repr. Lahore 1974.        | Lambton | Ann K.S. Lambton, <u>Landlord and Peasant in Persia</u> . Oxford, 1953.                    |
| Bayat   | Mangol Bayat, <u>Iran's First Revolution</u> . Oxford, 1991.                      | Menasce | J.-P. de Menasce, <u>Feux et fondations pieuses dans le droit sassanide</u> . Paris, 1964. |
| Kakar   | H.K. Kakar, <u>Government and Society in Afghanistan</u> . Austin & London, 1979. | Tirmizi | S.A.I. Tirmizi, <u>Mughal Documents (1526-1627)</u> . Manohar, 1989                        |

## PEOPLE

### About the Author

Mir Tamim Ansary was born in Afghanistan, where he grew up bilingual and bicultural. His father was among the earliest Afghan students in the United States. His mother was one of the first (half-dozen or so) American women to marry an Afghan and live in Afghanistan. After attending Istiqlal High School in Kabul, Mr. Ansary came to the United States to complete his studies. Later, he edited *The Asian Student* and other publications for The Asia Foundation in San Francisco. In 1979, Mr. Ansary traveled through the Muslim world. Upheaval in North Africa, revolution in Iran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan cut his travels short. He returned to San Francisco, where he went to work as an editor for a major children's book publishing company. His articles and short fiction have appeared in publications ranging from *The Los Angeles Times* to *Prism International*.

Currently he lives in San Francisco with his wife, Debby, and his daughters Jessy and Eliina, makes his living as a freelance writer, and is working on an epic novel about Afghanistan.

## Just what the doc ordered — Afghani jokes

By Charlie Patton


Staff writer

The day the drunken Russian officer insisted upon wearing his gun belt while demanding to be treated for severe abdominal pains was the day Mohammed Aziz Seraj realized he must leave his native land.

Abandoning his home, his possessions and his medical practice, Seraj took the next plane out of Kabul, Afghanistan, traveling under forged papers. His

eventual destination would be Jacksonville, where he has lived for the past decade.

Seraj, 75, who received his medical training at the University of Minnesota, Duke University and Johns Hopkins, is not licensed to practice medicine in the United States. Instead, he supports himself by working as a medical



technician and dreams of making a living as a writer.

His past efforts have included letters to the editor, religious pamphlets (he is of the Moslem faith) and contributions to various journals and newsletters.

Now he has authored his first book in English — he said he authored seven books about medicine published in Afghanistan. Titled *Afghan Jokes and Proverbs*, the slender volume is published by Vantage Press, a subsidized publishing house that charged Seraj \$5,000 to print the book. Proceeds from the sale of the book, priced at \$7.95, are split between Seraj and the publisher, which receives 60 percent.



See p. 28

## Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children

c/o International Rescue Committee  
386 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016  
Telephone: 212/679-0010 - Fax: 212/689-3459

Through overseas delegations, advocacy, and public education, the Women's Commission speaks on behalf of women and children around the world who have been forced to flee from their homes because of war, civil strife, famine, or persecution.

Fatana Ishaq Gailani, one of the refugees honored at this year's luncheon (see page 1), is an ardent supporter of literacy and training programs for Afghan refugee women. In December, at the invitation of the Women's Commission, she came to the United States to speak to women's groups and members of the press in New York and Washington. She also met with the editorial board of the *Los Angeles Times*. The newspaper subsequently published an editorial urging Boutros Ghali, the new United Nations Secretary General, to address the humanitarian needs of vulnerable population groups in Afghanistan. These people risk starvation if the world community does not respond to their needs.

**Women's Commission News**  
#3 February 1992

Many newly arrived refugee and immigrant women are "isolated, illiterate and victims of domestic violence, but they are expected to bring up children in the American system," says LE LIEU BROWNE, founder of the Refugee Women Council in Manhattan. To address these women's needs, the council is holding a conference today on "Refugee and Immigrant Women's Right to Know" at Hunter College's School of Social Work.

SIMA WALI, a keynote speaker, said she would call for training that helps refugee women become leaders. Speaking from personal experience, Ms. Wali will talk about "the constant marginalization" of women in the traditional Islamic, male-dominated society of Afghan refugees. After working with the Peace Corps in Kabul, Ms. Wali fled the war in 1979 and is now executive director of a Washington-based organization, Refugee Women in Development, and a member of the Refugee Trauma Center at Harvard University. **NYT 2/18**



Associated Press

**DOLLAR SENSE** — Mahbub Gul, an Afghan dealer of used clothing, shows one of some \$260 he's found in pockets of garments brought in from the U.S. He used to keep them of souvenirs until he discovered the dollar was worth several hundred thousand Afghanis, much more than he could have otherwise earned.

**Asbury Park Press 2/28**


From "Ethnic Niches Create Wealth of Jobs for the Region's Newest Immigrants" by

Donatella Lorch,  
**NYT - 1/12**

In the vast maze of cultures, Afghans offer yet another insight into the ethnic division of labor. One of the smallest and most recent groups of immigrants in the city, they are refugees from the fierce decade-long war in Afghanistan. Many of them lack higher education, trade skills, and have little knowledge of English. They are generally poor when they arrive. And unlike the Koreans and the Indians, their struggle for survival has had an impact on only a very specialized part of the city's economy.

In the last decade, with more than 200 stores, the Afghans have become specialists in the fast-food chicken business. To circumvent language and discrimination barriers, even their carpenters and chicken suppliers they use are Afghans. Their niche in the business originated in 1979, when Abdul Karim Halemi, a student from Kandahar in Southern Afghanistan, got his first job was in the kitchen at Kansas Fried Chicken. A year later, he opened the first Kennedy's Fried Chicken. Now there are 40 unfranchised restaurants with that name — all owned by Afghans, Mr. Halemi said.

Mr. Halemi said he and other established Afghan immigrants in New York lead the new arrivals by the hand through the chicken fast-food business. The tough part is teaching them the intricacies of running a business in New York City. "It's like a formula," Mr. Halemi said. "We tell them how to go to the building department, how to save money by cutting and installing their own bulletproof glass."



Abdul Karim Halemi

"You have to have some connection with somebody to succeed," said Mr. Halemi, who still works at his restaurant on Rockaway Boulevard in Queens behind the protection of bulletproof glass. "We all know each other. When the new ones come to the store, they sit. They watch. They learn and then they work."

## Afghan Whigs

Since I'm up on my soapbox, I might as well tell you what real rock 'n' roll is, grunge or no grunge, Seattle or no Seattle. Afghan Whigs, having just released *Congregation*, currently holds the disputable title of greatest rock 'n' roll band in all the land. They're from Cincinnati, Ohio, despite their identity as a Sub Pop band (Cincinnati grunge rock's where it's at, man).

They have a sound like storm clouds sweeping over the prairie, a thrilling, sorrowful noise that occupies immense space. In a time when very little music is truly unique, the Afghan Whigs strike me as considerably original.

Daily Northwestern 2/17/92



Paycom 12/18/91



# In 3 Languages, a National Idol Sings of Forgiveness and Peace

By DONATELLA LORCH

He is tall, balding and scholarly looking, and his name, Nashenas, means "unknown" in Persian. But on Saturday night, when Nashenas gave his second major public concert of his 40-year singing career and his first in New York, the 2,000 Afghans and Pakistanis in the audience knew exactly what his presence meant.

Men sat ramrod-straight and cried silently. Despite the heavy security in the Queens College auditorium, others tried to dance in the aisles. The crowd roared approval and screamed out song requests. Video cameras and tape recorders were neatly camouflaged under coats.

The audience was mostly men, some in Pakistani red and gold embroidered caps and high-heeled sandals, others in Afghan woolen hats and large shawls or green army jackets adopted as uniforms by the guerrillas. Organizers and fans said it was the largest Afghan crowd that New York had ever seen.

But the concert was more than just a gathering for passionate fans who worship Nashenas as a South Asian and particularly an Afghan Paul Simon — a singer capable of synthesizing pop, classical and folk songs in the three major languages of the Indian subcontinent, the hypnotic rhythms of Pashto, melodious Persian and romantic Urdu songs.

## Political Absolution

Nashenas's presence in New York and his fans' reaction were a microcosm of events in Afghanistan, the beginnings of a wary truce between those who escaped as refugees after the Soviet invasion in 1979 and those who chose to remain.

For many there, the concert stood as the political absolution of a man who many Afghan immigrants feel betrayed his homeland: he worked for a decade in the Communist government before going into exile in 1990. Perhaps the most grinding symbol of his disloyalty to the Afghans was Nashenas's singing the first song on Radio Afghanistan after the Communist coup in April 1978.

Before the concert Saturday night there had been meetings in mosques and in Afghan restaurants, and some Afghans boycotted the concert, but the overwhelming numbers proved that love of music carried the night.

Still, in the audience, many talked about the past. "I think he is here because he sincerely believes in bringing a message of his innocence," said Amin Tarzi, an Afghan student at New York University. "The message is that Afghanistan will be history if we ostracize everyone who stayed there."

## Singing in Every Family

But if factional politics have divided Afghanistan for centuries, the Afghan obsession with music has often overcome tribal and political barriers. The only jousts during the concert were shouts of "Pashto," "Farsi" and "Urdu" — fans demand-



Nashenas, an Afghan singer

ing the language of their choice.

"After all these doubts, there was definitely the feeling of 'Let's forgive and forget,'" said Mark Ginsberg, director of Voice Pictures, a co-organizer of the concert. "I think it has to do with the Afghan love of music. In every family someone sings. Nashenas is the only one left who can draw a crowd like that."

Nashenas, whose real name is Mohammed Sadiq Fitrat, insists he came to sing in New York in an effort to keep Afghan culture alive and insists he never was a member of the Communist Party or guilty of any crime. "There are many words in my songs that can prove what I am," he said in an interview before the concert. "I don't want to make a political statement. To love your motherland and to be with her in misfortune is not a fault."

## 3 Tongues and Many Styles

A self-taught musician of great vocal range, Nashenas, 37, has gathered a large following because he sings in the three of the major languages of the subcontinent and has synthesized a variety of styles: from Indian and Pakistani pop music to folk songs, and Islamic Sufi poetry and classics that he has set to music.

Nashenas never wanted to become a professional singer and chose his name so that his his identity would remain a mystery from his family. He began composing and secretly recording at 16, playing the harmonium

at night under his blankets, and it took four years before his father discovered the ruse and unsuccessfully ordered him to stop.

"He told me that I would never be respected and that the rest of my life I would be known as a singer," said Nashenas, who has always considered himself an amateur and has never earned money from singing. Fascinated by classical poetry and literature, he received a Ph.D. in Pashto literature at Moscow University and went on to be culture minister at the Afghan Embassy in Moscow during the war.

In 1979, after the coup, he gave his only public concert in Afghanistan in front of more than 20,000 people. He says he chose to give the concert to unveil his identity and so that he could make a speech proclaiming that he was not a member of the Communist Party. In September 1991, Nashenas and his family received political asylum in England.

Nashenas says he just wants to sing and live free of politics. But he still worries. After the concert, concerned that he might be mobbed, he was whisked away without even an encore.

His fans had difficulty toning down their adoration. "He has become a symbol for all Afghans," said Khalil Baburi, an oriental rug salesman. "He touches all our hearts when he sings and makes us feel like we are in Afghanistan. We can see it. We can smell Afghanistan."

THE NEW YORK TIMES JANUARY 14, 1992

# THE KABUL TIMES

## Change in curriculum to conform with present requirements

Provided by the Presidential Decree No. 260 of June 1990, the resolution No. 261 of the Council of Ministers a few months later in the same year and dictated by the needs and requirements of the society, the policy, objectives, structure curriculum, programme and text books for the primary and secondary schools throughout the country have undergone a radical change, stated Abdul Shokour Haidari, President of the Department for Translation and Compilation of the Education Ministry talking to a KT correspondent. Amina Sayed Zah

Asked to present an account of the main tasks of his department, Mr. Haidari said:

Before going into details of the obligations and tasks of the Translation and Compilation Department, I deem it necessary to tell you in brief of the educational policy and objectives which have been inspired by the Constitution. They can be listed:

— To train the children, teen-agers and the youth and to polish their abilities, talents and interests in line with the commands of the Sacred Religion of Islam, the accomplished national traditions and honours:

— To work the educational curriculum, teaching methods and evaluation methods based on the abilities, talents and interests of the children and the teen-agers and the youth;

— To adjust the primary intermediate and secondary education in harmony with the actual conditions and circumstances of life values and needs of the society . . .

Among the basis tasks of the department is to map out the educational plan, work out the curriculum and syllabus of the subjects included in the curriculum, prepare the text books and the

teachers' guides for the primary, secondary and intermediate schools.

When your correspondent asked him to elaborate the changes-qualitative and quantitative the curriculum, the syllabus and the class periods have undergone after the 11-class system was upgraded to 12-system as in the past, Mr. Haidari noted:

This move of promotion has caused too many changes in the curriculum, syllabus and class periods, say, a number of the subjects which had been found in disharmony with



Abdul Shokour Haidari.

th the needs and dictate of the present conditions of the society were either deleted or replaced by new ones. Such necessary changes were brought to the class periods as well. To be more precise, the subjects of Moral, Civil Information and Economy which are now taught in seventh, eighth and ninth grades respectively have replaced sociology which used to be taught in 10th and 11th grades in two class periods a week. Moreover, the Psychology has been introduced anew in the

taught to the 12th graders in two periods a week. A number of new vital and important subjects have been introduced to the curriculum which has of course increased the class periods.

Certainly any sort of change in the subjects and class periods directly affects the syllabus and the teaching programmes too, said President of the Department as the KT correspondent asked him what they had done new for the syllabus to conform with the new system of 12-class in this connection the department was instructed by the Ministry of Education to prepare and regulate the syllabus of different subjects included in the curriculum of the 12-class system in close and active consultation and cooperation with the concerned ulema, experts, and specialists of the Academy of Sciences, Kabul University, Ministry of Public Health, the academic and scientific members of the concerned departments of the Education Ministry.

Advised so, the Department for Translation and Compilation created numerous commissions in its offices and could swiftly prepare the syllabus so to be in conformity with the class periods and requirements of the present conditions. The new syllabus is expected to come out of print soon and to be circulated throughout the country. . .

For the new year of 1371 HS, 93 titles of books have been planned to be printed, almost two fold more than planned for the current year. It has to be clear that the Department in powerless for some reasons to print all the books of the new system, totalling 480 titles with a circulation of 25 million copies.

(By our Reporter.)

## American expert calls on President



KABUL, JAN. 26, (BLA) President Najibullah received in Presidential Office Ludvig Adamic Professor of history in a US Arizona University and an expert on Afghanistan yesterday afternoon.

In the meeting the President gave an account of the situation in the country, calling specifically the five-point UN Secretary General's peace plan a constructive framework allowing the settlement of the Afghan question. . . .

The Afghan leadership holds the view that the only way for just and acceptable solution of the Afghan situation can pass through dialogue and intra-Afghan understanding and we are ready for allround cooperation to this end, the President reiterated.

Thanking the President for the meeting, Prof. of Adamic said that the international circles and the peace-loving countries must exert serious

efforts for speeding up the process of political settlement of the Afghan issues, getting the Afghans together to decide the future of their country through understanding and talks.

He evaluated as precise and positive the efforts of the state of the Republic of Afghanistan in approaching the issues.

JANUARY 26, 1992.

# Local games in wedding ceremonies 2/10

In Afghanistan, almost each community of the population, notably in the provinces, has got and preserved its own culture and folklore, the characteristics and roots of which, can be traced in the treasury of the national customs and folkloric fashions. Therefore, the essence of our popular culture can be desirably assessed and evaluated.

One of the gains, one can say, of the folkloric culture in our country are the sport games which are performed in varying fashions in the ceremonies and jubilees of happiness and joy such wedding parties and the like. This, many believe, has been bequeathed over from the Arian era from generation to generation with slight and major introduced in the form of some of them. These games

are performed to entertain the parties and ceremonies as well as public and national festivals and jubilees. The people have given these games specific names, through the characteristics and distinctions of which, one can find their root and origin. Each of these games is mirroring the way of thinking and folkloric fashions of the people of the Afghan society in different periods of time. Among these games more popular are horse racing, jousting, Buzkashi and other hobbies such as rooster-fighting, quail-fighting, camel-fighting and others.

In central provinces particularly Hazarajat, horse racing is much popular in wedding ceremonies. After getting the lunch, the celebrants get out in a field or sports

grounds. First a distance is determined for racing and a sum of money is set with the name 'horse bet' with the agreement of the bride's father. This contest is attended by outstanding and versatile horsemen along with the horses well-fed and prepared for the event. The distance set for racing is called 'peta'. When the race is going on all are busy shouting and encouraging the racers, one of the elders is solving the deals between the relatives of the bride and the bridegroom in presence of their fathers. He is taking some money from the groom's father and give to the relatives of the bride with the name of 'Darga Geeri' and 'Sama'. Simultaneously, when these ceremonies end, the results of the race get clear and the rac-

ers come back to the point set earlier. The winner is given a reward.

Another popular game mostly performed in the wedding ceremonies particularly in the eastern and southern provinces is jousting, which has been mastered by Afghan tribes, notably, Sulaimankhel. In this game, 'Wara', the companions of the groom are coming to the bride's house to take her to the groom's village with the ceremonies and customs common, and mostly very interesting and even unforgetable for those outside of these communities. In front of the bride's house, they have to prove their competence and skill in local games. They can take the bride to the groom's houses only in case of success. Among these tests the most difficult is the racing and shooting game. The horsemen of

the groom's relatives have to shoot, while racing on horseback, a feather swinging from a string affixed in the middle of a long stick stuck to a high point. To take the bride is delayed until the feather is shot.

This game is performed in another fashion among the people of Zabul. The relatives of the bride are placing a few eggs in a suitable point with a distance of 100 to 150 meters, with the groom compelled to shoot them all to get the authority to take the bride home. In case of failure, he has to repeat it again next day. If successful, he can take the bride home, otherwise the wedding ceremonies is considered not to be that enjoyable.

'Qawaq' is a similar game played in Fariab. When the relatives of the bride and the groom go for taking the bride, here a metallic coin is hung from a point. The young horsemen are racing and shooting the coin. The winner is given prizes and rewards.

(Shah Mahmood)

useful workshop for up-garding the knowledge of entrepreneurs in leather industry, knitting, garment and dyeing carpets.

Providing and preparation of consultancy reports, feasibility studies which predicts the efficiencies of industrial projects is also another objective of the IDBA.

IDBA has one agency as an industrial center in Barikot of Kabul where 21 small scale industrial projects are settled. The facilities such as permanent availability of electricity, water, telephone and illiteracy courses are provided for them. The financial facilities and technical assistances are easily available for them too. At the moment, IDBA has one agency in Mazar-i-Sharif and it has in plan to establish more agencies in other provinces.

The IDBA was established in 1977 as a private Bank and its working capital was Afs. 240 million in the bank. It is owned by the government and its capital has increased to Afs. 740 million lately he concluded.

(By Saduddeen)

## IDBA provides loans to industrial institutions 1/23

The Industrial Development Bank of Afghanistan (IDBA) has envisaged allocation, Afs. 607 of million loan to the private projects showing over 98 per cent application of plan in the current year.

Similarly, the IDBA for the purpose of development and promotion of handicraft and cottage industry has a plan to establish one industrial market in Mazar-i-Sharif which 210 projects would be settled over there and some 4000 people would employed. In particular training programmes, some 65000 person would be trained in different fields there.

The above was stated by Eng. Haiatullah Aziz, president of the IDBA to the Kabul Times correspondent and added, the Bank has disbursed Afs. 480 million for 71 small and medium scale industrial projects and industrial cooperatives. The income statement of IDBA, audited by Khanna and Annadhaman Auditing Company, shows Afs. 150 million net income and Afs. 77 million net profit.

According to the res-



An employee of the industrial development bank in the computer department of the bank.

olution of board of directors one million Afs. is transferred to the National Commission for clearance of territory of Afghanistan, one million Afs. is transferred to the National Association of Disable in Afghanistan, and the rest of the profit is transferred according to the constitution of the IDBA to the legal reserves.

Aziz said: The fixed and current assets of IDBA are Afs. 63 million and Afs. 1902 million, in the 1989 there are Afs. 67 million and Afs. 2021 million respectively. There is an increase of 6.5 per cent in 1990 compared to the year 1989 in current assets. of the IDBA.

The main objective of the IDBA are the compared to the year follows:-

— Providing financial

four years. IDBA is financing the industrial project up to 70 per cent of their fixed and working capital.

— Providing of technical assistances and facilities is also one of the objectives of the IDBA. At the moment IDBA has absorbed US 1.5 million under the name of project which provides technical assistances to the handicrafts and cottage industries. Also IDBA has set up several

# Regional commission proposed to be formed to facilitate political settlement

To begin with, I would like to speak about my tours of Iran and Pakistan and to the Republic of Afghanistan is aimed at: In the first place we want to reach new contacts with these countries in political, diplomatic, trade, economic, scientific and cultural spheres.

As for Iran precisely, I would like to say that in the course of my stay there, I made calls on President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Rafsanjani, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Economy and Money. As a result of these meetings, we agreed that Iran and Russia should reach direct contacts in all spheres. Serious attention was given to the expansion of trade and economic relations and we agreed to triple the volume of our trade and economic exchanges. Moreover, it was agreed to turn the Caspian zone into a favourable economic site for each other. Further, Iran got prepared to be more active in the process of a political settlement in Afghanistan, to support the good offices by the United Nations in this respect and to contribute in peaceful solution of this question, while preserving the territorial integrity of Afghanistan.

We also met the representatives of the Mujahiddin located on the Afghan-Iranian border line to whom, we made clear the position of Russia concerning the political settlement of the Afghan problem and reached an agreement securing the release of the Soviet prisoners of war and the imprisoned Mujahiddin. As a result of our meetings a joint Russian-Iranian statement was released.

As for the meetings in Pakistan, you of course know that the government of Pakistan has recognized the independence of Russia. In Pakistan, we held talks with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Sardar Ali, Chairman of Se-

Russian Vice-President Alexander Rozhkov who paid a working visit to Kabul on December 21-22, held a press conference for foreign and local journalists before he left for home. Text of the conference is presented:

name, Akram Zaki, General Secretary of Foreign Ministry, Sardar Ali, Minister of Economy and Finance. We reached an agreement to develop and sign in the near future a bilateral treaty on all-round cooperation. We also agreed that a meeting of the representatives of the USA, China, Russia, Pakistan and India be held to discuss nuclear non-proliferation in Southwestern Asia. The Pakistani side pledged to actively contribute in the political and peaceful solution of the Afghan question and expressed its identity with Iran and Russia in this regard.

As far as the question of Afghanistan is concerned, in Islamabad I got the opportunity to meet with the representatives of the Afghan opposition. First I met the Tansim leaders individually and later in group. I had a call on Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Sebgathullah Mujaddi, Peer Gallani, Mohammad and Sheikh Asef. The point to mention is that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar also joined our meeting which was in group.

I would like to note that as a result of these meetings, most of the opposition representatives spoke out in favour of the statement by the UN Secretary General, prescribing the Afghan political settlement. Moreover, we assessed the agreements reached earlier in Moscow. You know that in the recent past, a delegation of the Afghan opposition, headed by Mr. Rahani, had paid a visit to Moscow, invited by President Yeltsin. You are aware that we worked out a written treaty and discussed the agreements and the statement. We reached an agreement to set up a joint commission at the soonest to be involved in the political solution of the Afghan problem.

As regards the prison-

ers, we agreed that these prisoners should be released till December 23 gradually and the same will be started in Afghanistan too concerning the imprisoned Mujahiddin. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar provided us the opportunity to meet a Soviet prisoner, Nikolai Virodov, who is in his detention since 1981. He has been permitted to write a letter to his mother and send it to Russia.

You may have learnt that in Islamabad they extradited one of the prisoners, called Habibullah, managed by Hekmat Mujaddi as a gesture of good will which he showed sincerely. There is a mistake, and I have no doubt that Mr. Mujaddi might have had an intention to cheat us. He himself was misled and he handed over a prisoners whose name was Habibullah. This was a suspicion for me and members of my delegation. Neither I have any doubt in sincerity of Mujaddi, nor do members of my delegation. The prisoner with the name of Habibullah son of Babagul a resident of Dawlatabad of Turkmenistan was returned to us, but after we made some researches, there exists not such a region in Turkmenistan, but in the Republic of Afghanistan. A letter sent to us takes the note Habibullah was enlisted in the army in 1989 and held as prisoner in 1990. And you know that in 1989, the Soviet troops were not in Afghanistan and had left it one year earlier. He himself disclosed that he had not served in the Soviet army. Habibullah is now submitted to the office of the International Committee of the Red Cross and my advisor, Ivan is involved in this, so that he can be given to his family. I have got some considerations in this regard which I would like to raise with them.

They intended to cheat Mujaddi. Since Mr. Mujaddi is in favour of the political solution through dialogue and peaceful means, I want to remark that the Russian side has faithfully fulfilled what it has undertaken towards the Moscow agreements.

According to the Moscow statement, the Mujahiddin are bound to set free the first batch of the prisoners and we will see how they will fulfil their share of undertakings. As far as the Afghan side is concerned I mean the State of the Republic of Afghanistan and President Najibullah in person, they intend to set free a group of elderly prisoners as a move of good will to facilitate the political solution of the question. I do not tell you their number, but I say that it is a considerable number.

As for the subsequent measures by Russia, I thought statement be issued by the governments of Iran, Pakistan and Russia in favour of the United Nations scheme. Following these visits, I hope to see the leaders of Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. I will request leaders of these republics to be involved in the process of Afghan political solution. Securing the agreement and commitments of the presidents of the independent republics which are to the north of Afghanistan; we intend to set up a joint commission involving the representatives of the State of the Republic of Afghanistan, the Afghan opposition, Iran, Pakistan, the representatives of Russia, Tajikistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

Following the creation of this commission, we want to appeal United Nations and its Secretary General as well as the Security Council to officially register this commission as the official commission of the United Nations. We have agreed with President Najibullah on the headquarters of this commission to be in Kabul. After the commission is formed, the first

appeal should be for ceasefire and the implementation of the UN Secretary General's statement. This was the whole which I could tell you. Now I would like to answer your questions.

Question by Sayed Yaqub Wazir, reporter of Afghan Radio-TV: In the course of your stay here, you had meetings with President Najibullah and other members of the government. What is your assessment of these talks?

Answer: In meetings with the Afghan President and Prime Minister, I raised my views concerning the positions of Iran and Pakistan and the Afghan opposition representatives. The idea I set forth was supported by President and Prime Minister of Afghanistan. They both believe that only the Afghan people can solve the Afghan question and set the future state and government system of Afghanistan. Since the differences between the Afghan government and the opposition are an obstacle to the commission which we intend to form will level the path. The United Nations will superintend the process of political solution and the commission will be involved in it. The commission will be drawn from among representatives of independent states. After the Afghan question is tackled politically and peacefully, the Afghan people will convene elections to choose the future government. No other choice exists.

...Question by France Press: In Pakistan you said that the Russian Republic would be in contact with various institutions of Pakistan. Do you intend to keep on your military cooperation with Afghanistan too?

Answer: All aspects of cooperation have to be employed for wide-scale relations to take shape with other countries. As for the questions of arms deliveries to a third country, this can be solved by parliament. When the drafts of these contracts are worked out and formulated, the parliament will then decide. (BIA)

12/23

## Afghan disguised as Russian POW

On the basis of the talks held between the opposition delegation and the vice-president of the Russian Federation, the high-ranking delegation of that Federation first left for Iran for a meeting with the high ranking authorities of that country. Then the delegation left for Pakistan and urged the Afghan opposition to extradite the Soviet POWs as per the eight-point joint statement released in Moscow. But, unfortunately, the opposition groupings by masterminding another plot instead of extraditing a Soviet POW they extradited an Afghan to Mr. Rotskoi, the Vice President of the Russian Federation. The Afghan said the following:

My name is Babaqui and my father's name is Haji Begi. I am a resident of Madan village, of Dawlatabad district in Fariab Province. Dawran is my brother

and Kerim is my Uncle. My father died many years back and I was working on a piece four hectares of land.

At the end of 1367 HS I was enlisted in commander Jamil battalion in Quraish village, Dawlatabad district, Fariab province. After some times, I was sent to Chakari region, Kabul province. It was midnight that I was arrested during the war by a Mujaheddin grouping attached to Zabiti Khaksar. The group took me to Peshawar and handed me over to Khayat regiment attached to Hazrat Mujaheddin. I was working as a pion in that regiment for three years.

"One day Ismael Khan, the commander of this regiment told me to go to the house of Mujaheddin Sahib in Islamabad. We went there and were told that guests would come and you have to introduce yourself as a resident of Turkmenistan and they

also gave me some dollar and Pakistan Rupee. I introduced myself as a resident of Turkmenistan to the vice president of the Russian Federation. They extradited me as a Soviet POW to the vice president of that federation. He took me to Kabul, to leave for the Russia the day after. But I told him that I wasn't a Russian and I was a resident of Madan village located in Fariab province. He said that it does not matter whether I would like to go or not? I said that I would like to leave for my native place, Fariab province. That is why he didn't take me



**Babaqui**

and I am now in Kabul" said Babaqui.

Babaqui who loves his native place added that he decided to leave for Fariab to live there.

(K. Sayedzadah)

1/6/92

## Gas regularly supplied

To provide further facilities to our countrymen a condensed gas filling station was established in the framework of the ministry of commerce in 1365 HS. As per the commitments by the former Soviet Union with the Ministry of Commerce, the former had annually put one thousand litres of condensed gas at the disposal of the station in gratis aid which is being regularly supplied

to the consumers through its 16 outlets in the capital and of its agencies in Pulikhumri, Mazari Sharif and Haliratan border uninterruptedly...

It is worth mentioning that the private entrepreneurs have of late imported 1200 tonnes of gas along with gas equipment stoves heaters, balloons etc. which were all supplied to our countrymen.

2/13

## AIC's income exceeds Afs. 125.9 millions

With an initial capital of Afs. 15 millions the Afghan insurance company was set up in 1343 HS to protect the national capital, promote the national investment, guarantee the new investments. The Afghan insurance company would accept 90 percent risk to reinsure its goods in sister companies abroad. But thanks to the persistent work of its staff that the company gradually became self-reliant, reducing the share of the sister companies in its own interest.

According to the President of the Afghan insurance company, the net profit of the company was Afs. 12 million in 1368, 20 million in 1369, 32 million in 1370 HS. He told me that the balance

of the company between the years 65-68 has promoted to Afs. 287 million. The president of the company is hopeful that the net profit of the company would for sure show an increase in 1369 compared to 1368.

The company has also increased its investment during the aforementioned years, say the capital of the company was promoted to Afs. 75 million in 1359 and to 175 million in 1369 HS.

As the president of the company told me, the customers of the company have been considerably increased during the recent years.

From the income of its insurance tax, the company has managed to invest both inside and outside the country.



**Mohammad Younsif Doo**

I asked the president of the company if it has identified compensation I heard in response that they have compensated Afs 2300 million and 15000 dollars to our customers during the years 1367-1369.

The company mainly insures the dangers emanating from conflagration

and fire, thunderbolts, flood, storm and avalanches, explosions, natural and unexpected calamities, insuring the robbery of goods and cash money, insurance of incidents, insuring the safety of workers during their official work, insurance of vehicles export and import goods, transit insurance as well as the insurance of passenger planes both during the local and foreign flights.

Speaking on the operational plan of the company during the nine months of the current year the president of the company said that the operational plan in its insurance income exceeds Afs. 125.9 million which has been implemented by Afs. 219.7

million indicating an increase of 178 percent and the income of the company in other spheres during the same period has been Afs. 165 million, showing the implementation of the plan by 100 percent. Similarly, the compensation of the damages during the nine months of 1369 HS have been increased by 32 percent and according to the plan it shows a decrease of 56 percent.

The company is hopeful that with the restoration of peace and termination of hostilities in the country the scope of its activities would be further expanded both at the national and international level and thus serving the compatriots befittingly.

(By Shukria Kohistan)

2/13



# Zhwak brings out a valuable book entitled

## Afghan Music

"Afghan Music" is the title of a book, written by Titirnamal M. Deen Zhwak, a renowned, 77 years old, historian and folklorist in Pashtu language. The collection of "Afghan Music" was edited by M. M. Jehad and published in 374 pages by Ariana Printing House in 1970 HS (1181). Zhwak is a meritorious member of the Writers' association of Afghanistan. The book has been compiled and divided into five portions as presented hereunder:

Firstly, the book includes an introduction in which valuable information as regards the start of music in our beloved homeland, Afghanistan, has been reflected. Going through this passage acquaints the reader to the stage-wise evolution of music and Pushtu folk songs, achieved in the course of history in this country.

Secondly, Ustad Farukh Afandi's biography has been written in brief. Subsequently, services in the area of folk song's notations and in enriching local Afghan music have been pictured for which he has been held in reverence by the writer. This part of the book familiarizes the readers with certain social and educational information. Consequently, the readers enthusiastically get acquainted with the most desirable aspects of social, cultural and traditional arts as well as various talks of life in different parts of the country through glancing at the historic background of Pushtu folk songs. This sort of information will not only be of great use to the present and future generations but it will also serve as source of inspiration of artists, musicians and researchers to conduct further studies for elucidation of the dark aspects of the Pushtu folk songs. This unique book has never manifested itself in the present form during the long Afghan history. Therefore, it will be noteworthy to mention that such a collection of subjects could be a matter of much interest to all readers. Obviously, it would have been improbable to gain accessibility

to such a well-compiled book without the untiring, painstaking and continuous efforts of a "Golden personality". Ustad M. Deen Zhwak, who showed an unprecedented patience to spend forty years of his age in bringing it out. Surely, the present and future Afghan generations will be proud of Ustad Zhwak's charismatic works in bringing out this collection of Pushtu master piece and will regard it as the great achievement of an astute scholar, who enduringly incorporated in resuscitation and elucidation of almost dwindling folk songs by converting them into standard notations.

Ustad Zhwak has classified Pushtu folk songs into the following four parts in his book:

1— Kandahar folk song style,

2— Nangarhar folk song style,

3— Paktia folk song style,

4— Logar folk song style.

Kandahar folk songs contain the following songs and legends:

— "Atan" or songs for local dancing.

— "Shiora" or "Sha Woro Woro" i.e. "well, go slowly, slowly." It means that be cautious in approaching with your wife's family members, otherwise, in compatibility of temper will cause friction.

— "Khorshadi", "Oh, my dear sister".

This is an introductory song for marriage ceremony.

— Dowla Dowla Tari Akhla, i.e. "Take two strings of my hairs".

It is a song which is sang when the bride's hairs are done up to a plaited style.

— "Babuala", it is sang at the first day of marriage when bride's relatives usher her into a special seat to sit on it.

— "D-Sheen Khalei Nare" or "song of a green spot". It is usually sang for a green spot which is put on the bride's forehead as a symbol of love and affection.

— "Kakalei Ghala", it is a folk song attributed



to a famous Pushtun tribe in Kandahar region.

— "D-Hutaki Nare", or "song of Hutaki tribe".

This song was especially common at Hutakali's period. Therefore, the song is traditionally referred to them. These type of songs possess long historic values.

— School of legendary songs of Fateh Khan Baliz and Shadi Bibo. This folk song illustrates some legendary and folkloric aspects of life in Kandahar region. In these folk songs certain cultural and traditional customs which have infiltrated the people's notions emanates from Fateh Khan Baliz's story.

2— Nangarhar folk song school. This school includes the following type of songs:

— Muqam or "place of rank"—This type of songs are quatrains or foursome. But some times it is not necessarily composed of quatrains because it even includes ten to twelve verses of songs.

— Charbeita, "kustrains", is of two types: simple quatrains and chained quatrain.

— Badalei—This is usually known as Ghazal "lyric poem or ode".

— Keisei, (story).

— Baqati—It is similar to "Landai".

— Bageti—It is similar to Landai or "short songs", with fluent and simple composition.

— "Loubi", it is also a simple type of Pushtu folkloric song, illustrating loving affairs between a young man and a young lady in a romantic style.

— "Dastanona" i.e. "stories". This type of songs illustrates stories in poetical composition.

— "Mushahera" i.e. capping verses or poetical contest.

3— Paktia Folk Songs Style:

In this style the following artistic aspects of songs have been reflected: — Songs; Aran, "dancing" and "Sarakai" i.e. dissection.

Dissections are those songs which at their ends a "Landai" or "short poetical verses" are usually added.

4— Logar Folk Songs Style:

In this style of songs the following interesting aspects of folkloric lyrics are reflected:

This style of song sheds light on historic aspects of the origin of songs and, simultaneously, some renowned folk singers have been introduced in brief.

Fifthly — Short songs, "Landai", have been also expounded in this book. Ustad Zhwak expresses his personal views on the subject matter of the short songs and, consequently, presents a credible reference for readers and enthusiasts in theoretical illustration of his book.

The "Afghan Music" in addition to its theoretical and artistic aspects of explanation contains two other significantly important portions:

1— Featuring portion, which designates artistic activities of artists.

2. Notations.

Undoubtedly, it requires to be emphasized, once again, that the book entitled, "Afghan Music" can be utilized as a major, reliable source of scientific information for conducting further study on Pushtu folkloric songs in future. It can also serve as a good reference for scholars, academicians, folklorists, culturalists, artists and other fact-finding missions. For this very reason, the readers will extend their cordial appreciation and gratitude to its writer for his unique achievement in bringing out a collection of superb information which accessibility to it could not be expected without



Griban apot, a symbol of folk songs



relentless endeavors made by Ustad Zhwak.

Last but not least, the writer extends his indebtedness for writing his book to Mahmood Farukh Afandi, Prof. M. Gul Noori, Ustad Gh. Husain and Ustad Ghulam Ghafoor Brishna and others.

(By: F. M. Sami)  
JANUARY, 28, 1982




# CHRONOLOGY

11/9 - KT - Sidiq Afghan, the Afghan philosophical mathematician now living in St. Petersburg, predicted that Mikhail Gorbachev will become UN Sec'y Gen'1 in 1995.

12/10 - BIA - In a press conference, Najibullah said that Afghanistan was ready for direct negotiations with Pakistan & "to abandon face to face war & start economic, commercial, cultural & technical cooperation with each other."

12/11 - BIA - A commission headed by Dep. Prime Min. A.S. Salim was created to lower "organizational swelling" in various gov't ministries. During 1992, strict measures will be adopted to prevent the expansion of the bureaucracy.

12/18 - Payam (the Party paper) -



-- Even with all the problems, hope for a political solution is still possible.

12/22 - KT - The RA recognized Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Khirghizistan, Azerbaijan & the Russian Federation.

12/25 - KT - The RA recognized the Ukraine & Byelorussia.

12/26 - BIA - Heywad reported that a criminal network was distributing counterfeit bank notes in the RA. The notes are in denominations of Afs. 500 & 1,000.

12/29 - KT - The Islamic Assn. of China & the Chinese Red Crescent gave the Afghan Red Crescent \$100,000 worth of medical equipment & stationery.

1/5 - KT - The Communications Ministry will buy & install 24 wireless units to bring radio & TV programs to residents of Nemroz, Farah, Helmand & Kandahar provinces. The Kandahar telephone exchange is to be restored.

1/6 - KT - A new telephone exchange was installed in Chazni & 3 other Chazni exchanges were reactivated.

1/13 - LA Signal - The US fears that Afghan guerrillas may sell the Stingers in their possession to the highest bidders, which may be terrorist groups. Supposedly Iran has bought some & both Iraq & Libya have made offers.

1/16 - KT - "Molki Hawa," the magazine of the Civil Aviation & Tourism Ministry has resumed publication after a 13-year hiatus.

- Mir Azizulhaq Zaeifi & Omar Momand were named dep. chief justice & pres. of the penal court of the Supreme Court respectively.

1/19 - KT - The Afghan Bank Milli granted loans worth \$132m to nat'l traders & private entrepreneurs & Afs. 10,640m for the growth of exports.

Similarly the bank has helped the raise of the current, deposit and saving accounts in this period. Say, the last year's balance of the bank indicates that there were over Afs. 10616 , million 11844 million and 252 million in the deposit, current and as well as saving accounts respectively.

It should be mentioned that this bank is a share holder in the 23 internal economic institutions and it paid Afs. 250 million as a share to Ariana Afghan Airline in the current year.

1/19 - KT - Najib declared 2/15/92 as "Nat'l Salvation Day of the People of Afghanistan." Coinciding with the anniversary of the Soviet troop withdrawal, "this occasion is likely to be observed.

1/24 - NYT - As the war grinds down, Afghans are flooding into Darra to sell their guns, according to Edward Gargan. And gun prices are going down.

Just a few years ago, an AK-47 cost \$1,200. The 11,000 rupees sought by the guerrilla fighter who called on Mr. Khan was equal to less than \$500. Marifat Shah, a farmer from a small village south of here, sat on the carpet in Mr. Khan's shop, eyeing a shotgun. Overhearing the conversation with the Afghan rebel, he smirked slightly. "Not more than 9,000," he said. "I have one. I know."

For Mr. Khan, the gun dealer, the end of the boom years of the Afghan war is just another vagary of business, and the cause of the mujahedeen just a tremor in a curve of supply and demand. "My father and my grandfather sold guns," he said. "If the Afghans don't want guns, somebody will. Prices go up. Prices go down. This is business."

# Afghans' folk ideas

There was a folk idea among the people that good quality diamonds could be found with the help of bats. The idea was that, immediately after the bats give birth to babies, some one should take the babies away from the nest, and place them beneath a glass, or something made of glass, and wait until the mother attempts to recover them. According to the legend, she will try to do so by breaking the glass with a diamond she has taken from a mine. Also according to the legend the diamond she uses will be the most valuable in the world. The bat is also famous for "Shaparak-i-Charmee" among the people.

There is a long-tailed bird, coloured black and white, called magpie, which, according to Afghan's folk ideas is usually a carrier of good news, especially from travellers back to their loved ones and families.

Whatever its message is, good or not, can be predicted by looking at how it sits. If it sits facing Mecca, the news it brings will be certainly good.

The legend further says that, should a woman see

the bird in such a position she can discover what the good message is by addressing the bird this way:

Oh, Khush Khabarak. Dahanet Pur Shakarak. Bu go Khabare. Khushat Ra. "Oh happy messenger, your bill is full of sugar. If you have good news for me caw out once."

It is also worth mentioning that the Afghan people have folk ideas about "cat".

The tongue of the cat, according to legend, is made out of diamonds and whatsoever is liked by her is therefore, clean and should not be washed. If the hair of the cat falls in food and be eaten, it is thought that the person who eats it will get a disease (Azar-i-Moraq).

Owners of houses can tell whether they will have guests by watching their cats.

When the cats sit opposite the door and look with their hands and face, the guests will soon arrive. It is further thought that cats are capable of enduring any kind of pain, even torture, and that is needed to kill one for certain.

Swallow is, a white and

lack small singing bird, loved by every one. The people allow the swallow to make nests on the ceiling of their buildings. he birds are allowed to be as free as they please.

Also people believe that at some verses. Therefore, people do not among them and believe that to be a nuisance to these innocent birds is like committing a great religious sin.

There is also another folk idea among the people that if they take swallow to their rooms and then one of its wings with "suffron or curry, the swallow will return next year and bring a present for the household.

There is, likewise, a folk idea about the pigeon among the Afghan people. People believe that the pigeon, especially about the white dove that has agreement with fairys. A few people find useful to have one or two pairs of doves with them.

On the other hand, they think it wouldn't be any good to hunt and eat the meat of dove. They are of the opinion that any one who consumes

the meat of dove will either become ill or insane.

Also they think the ring-dove should not be killed, because they believe the neck had been ringed red by the blood of the martyrs.

Similarly, the patridge's eye is thought, in folk ideas, to be salty and therefore cause bad luck and evil fortune to every beautiful thing it looks upon.

Likewise the crow (a black bird) mostly appears in the sky during the winter, especially when the white snow blanket, the white snow blanketed. The people interprets its cawing to mean "snow", "snow" and are of the folk idea that this cawing, in fact, brings on the snow.

Legends about dogs are also common among the Afghans. For example, the howling of dogs, famous by the name of "Qoola Kashidan" is thought to cause bad luck. When a dog is observed to lie on its back with its legs in the air, legends takes it as a symbol of a coffin and a sign that there will be a death in the family of the dog owner.

It is further thought that

at cats are capable of enduring any kind of pain, even severe torture. People believe that cats have seven souls and one must kill seven times because it is believed that all cats have seven lives. However, the person who does kill the cat will himself pay the consequences madness or will be killed and the ghosts will take revenge upon him.

There are also folk ideas about many other animals. Concerning mice, it is thought that the food they have touched should not be eaten and that the presence of many mice in a house means there is also a traitor there.

Assess are believed, in folk ideas, sometimes act as doctors. Panariast diseases on the toes and fingers can be cured according to legends, by putting the wounded finger in the asses ear.

According to traditionally accepted norms white cocks should be killed on the eve of the new year. There are many other folk ideas about birds, animals and natural things among various ethnic groups in different parts of Afghanistan. The most common ones were explained in the above.

(By F. M. Sami)

An Afghan playing traditional conching horn. Horn is a wind musical instrument often played in uni son with drums in national festival and marriage ceremonies in rural areas of the country.



## US expert believes in rout of fundamentalism

Tamse Deer head of a center for Afghanistan studies at Nebraska University in USA who has recently returned from Pakistan has disclosed that the ISI or the espionage network of Pakistan procures special funds for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and that the Pakistan government at ti-

mes had no say in the policy pursued by ISI.

He has added that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar also receives huge sums from other fundamentalist groupings.

Tamse believes that fundamentalism is on the verge of a virtual collapse more so in view of the mounting rifts between Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Pak authorities.

1/18

Speaking to the VOA, Anwarulhaq, an Afghan scholar, presently teaching in one of the USA universities has expressed his concern in case the Afghan hardliners take over in Afghanistan. He has also said that should the same happen, then the Afghans would have to live through a period of terror and oppression at the hand of fundamentalists.



1/27 - UN Press Release AFG/38 (issued 2/7) - UN Sec'y Gen'l Boutros Ghali made a statement regarding the convening of a gathering of about 150 Afghans to discuss transition mechanisms which could lead to the establishment of a broad-based gov't in Afghanistan through free & fair elections. The gathering would be held outside the region. (See 2/7, 2/27, 3/13).

1/28 - KT - The Council of Ministers approved an increase of Afs. 100,000 in the price of ginned cotton.

- An RA delegation will soon go to Tajikistan to discuss the export & sale of Afghan natural gas. Work is being done with "concerned institutions of the Russian Federation & some other foreign firms to extract & refine oil & create medium refineries in the country."

2/2 - KT - Pakistan has stopped giving arms to Afghan mujahideen. The budget allocated for that purpose by Saudi Arabia & the US has been spent & Pakistan does not have weapons to give the mujahideen. "According to BBC, Pakistan is no longer ready to play the role of military advisor & leader for the Afghan opposition." (See 2/19 & related articles on pp. 6,8, 11)  
- Najibullah welcomed Pakistan's new policy.

- Frontier Post -

PAK-US VIEWS ON  
AFGHAN SOLUTION SAME




2/7 - UN Press Release AFG/35 - Benon Sevan, on a 3-day visit to Peshawar, met with 20 leading field commanders, 200 tribal leaders, members of various commissions, organizations & parties to discuss the Sec'y Gen'l's proposal (see 1/27).  
- NYT - Edward Hurwitz was named US Amb. to Kyrgyzstan, formerly Kirghizia, Hurwitz had served in Afghanistan in the mid-1980s.

2/8 - KT - Sultan Ali Keshtmand, a former RA prime minister, was attacked at a Kabul mosque yesterday by an unknown person. "A security source... said the case was interrogated by a competent commission & the results are to be announced to the public. The perpetrator is absconding."

2/9 - KT - A 100-line telephone switchboard opened in Cheghcheran in Ghor.  
- NYT - The organizations led by Moja-dedi, Gailani & Moh'd Nabi issued a statement describing the UN initiative as the "most appropriate option under the present conditions" for an Afghan settlement. However -

"The four radical Islamic guerrilla groups based in Pakistan suffered a setback last week when the Pakistani Government, the conduit for Western arms for the guerrillas, threw its weight behind the United Nations plan. Three of the radical factions have rejected the peace initiative as a conspiracy to deny them power. A fourth group criticizes it as vague but has not rejected it outright."

- Frontier Post -



2/10 - BIA - Over 80,400 sq. meters of carpet were exported to 20 countries during the 1st 9 months of this year, earning \$37m.

2/13 - KT - At the request of Benon Sevan, the RA released 8 political prisoners, including 5 Pakistanis who were turned over to Mr. Sevan. The RA says it has released over 20,000 political prisoners in the past 5 years.


2/19 - NYT - Edward Gargan writes about Pakistan's new policy:

The reversal of the Government's Afghanistan policy and the suppression of the Kashmir march, in particular, have drawn the wrath of the fundamentalist Jamat-e-Islami party. The party's leader, Qazi Hussain, insists that the only legitimate government possible in Afghanistan is one led by the fundamentalist rebels, who deserve to rule because, in his view, they drove out the Soviet Army.

But many of the Central Asian republics, wary of the encroachment of fundamentalism in their domains, are encouraging a moderate government in Kabul and have told Pakistan that they will not tolerate a rebel triumph.

Among the more moderate members of the National Assembly here, Pakistan's larger regional interests are now seen as vastly outweighing any emotional commitment to the spread of militant Islam in Afghanistan.

"Unless we have a good relationship with Afghanistan, we have no chance of establishing social, cultural, economic and geographical links with the newly independent Muslim Central Asian countries," Kunwar Khalid Yunus, a National Assembly member, wrote recently. "If we lose this chance again, as we did in the late 70's, and last year just because of zealots' pressure, God may not give us another opportunity."



2/27 - CSM In Geneva, Benon Sevan told newsmen that things were underway to host an Afghan gathering. (See 3/13)

3/1 - LA Signal - A rocket hit Kabul Saturday, killing 17 people & injuring 120.

3/10 - NYT - Najib appealed to the US for help in stopping the spread of fundamentalist Islam in Central Asia (see p. 13).

3/13 - NYT - Peace time? Edward Gargan writes there's hope:

"This is it," said a senior United Nations official, who only agreed to speak anonymously. "If it is going to happen, it will happen now or it will never happen."

The peace plan, put together by Benon Sevan, an Armenian who represents the United Nations Secretary General here and in Pakistan, involves first assembling 150 Afghans in Vienna to begin planning their country's future.

These 150 are to represent all political and religious viewpoints, all ethnic groups and all tribal divisions, Afghan exiles and even the former king, Zahir Shah, who was overthrown in 1973.

None of them, however, will be "prominent personalities," Mr. Sevan's euphemism for Mr. Najibullah and the main rebel leaders.

The 150 are to choose 35 representatives who will spend a month or so soliciting ideas on Afghanistan's future from the broadest possible spectrum of society. Then they will summon a loya jirga, or grand assembly, a traditional tribal gathering, that will decide on the shape and composition of a transitional government leading to elections and a new government. All this is to happen by early summer.

Several of the rebel groups have expressed an interest in participating in the process. But others have denounced the plan for including representatives of the Kabul Government and say the plan will thwart creation of an Islamic state.

Rumblings of discontent are also audible among officials of Mr. Najibullah's Government.

"The problem is the struggle between the leaders," said Zahir Tanin, a member of the central committee of the Homeland Party, the successor to the Afghan Communist Party. . . .

At least three factions exist in the Homeland Party, according to some of its more candid members:

1. A hard-line group that opposes the peace plan and believes they can tough out any challenge to the Kabul regime, either from the rebels or the internal factions.

2. A group that believes an alliance with the rebels would permit the Homeland Party and the rebels to co-exist.

3. A more liberal current that supports Mr. Sevan and believes in the establishment of a moderate, demo-

cratic state, a position that implies the demise of the Homeland Party and of Mr. Najibullah's resignation and departure from Afghanistan. . . .

Mr. Najibullah, by all accounts, has remained aloof from the factionalism, relying on the power he derives from his control of the secret police. A senior member of the party says the Afghan President is wary of Mr. Sevan's plan and its implication that he will have to step aside.

"If he evaluates that the future is not to his benefit, then one should worry," the official said. "What could be suggested for Mr. Sevan to do? He must follow his program, and at the same time try to frighten Kabul. Then Najib must accept."

Like many here in recent weeks, this party member expressed the hope that the United States would play a more active role in the peace process.

"If the United States wanted to use its influence, quite a lot would change," he said. "A clearcut signal that the United States supports the peace process would take the guts away from the factions and would give them a signal that they have to move."

A central obstacle to Mr. Sevan has been Mr. Najibullah's public expressions of support for the United Nations plan, but his refusal so far to submit his list of the 150 people he would like to attend the first Vienna conference. But in an interview today, Mr. Najibullah declared that he had decided to submit

a list, a gesture that will persuade many that he is serious about entering the peace process.

"If he is willing, we will hand over a list to him," he said, referring to Mr. Sevan.

#### The U.N. as Bulldozer

A senior Asian diplomat here, who admitted that he has long been pessimistic about Afghanistan's future, expressed some confidence that Mr. Sevan's plan could actually force peace onto the country. "The peace process is a bulldozer that is going to roll over Afghanistan," said the diplomat. "At least, that is what Benon Sevan wants."

Mohammed Ashgar, a former mayor of Kabul who never joined the Communist Party and is one of the few politicians here who owes no allegiance to Mr. Najibullah, said the success of the peace process depended less on the participation of the rebels than on the President's acquiescence.

"We have been trying to convince Dr. Najibullah indirectly, through our writings, that the Communist Party is responsible for the problems of Afghanistan," said Mr. Ashgar, who now heads the National Salvation Front, a tiny group of political moderates opposed to Mr. Najibullah but tolerated by the Government.


"The Communist Party has changed its name and its constitution, but the leaders are the same, the leaders who are responsible for the tragedy of Afghanistan. There is a crisis of confidence now," Mr. Ashgar said.

"Dr. Najibullah says one thing and does another. That is the difficulty. Time is short. It is 11:55, or probably later."

## Soldiers of vision

THE United Nations peace plan for Afghanistan has received a much-needed shot in the arm. On January 27th Pakistan's foreign minister, Mohammad Khan Kanju, said that the UN proposals—for an interim government representing all the Afghan parties and then for democratic elections—marked the only way forward for Afghanistan. And he warned the radical Afghan mujahideen, led by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who oppose it, that the plan "cannot be held hostage by a few".

Pakistan's government has, of course, said similar things before. Indeed it has paid lip service to a negotiated settlement since Benazir Bhutto became prime minister after President Muhammad Zia ul Haq was killed in an air crash in 1988. In practice, however, Pakistan continued to back a military solution, and to funnel arms and cash to the mujahideen. What has changed?



Hikmatyar, out in the cold

Miss Bhutto was never able to wrest control of Afghan policy from the army, whose top generals shared General Zia's vision of the Afghan mujahideen seizing Kabul and installing an Islamic government there. The most she achieved was to appoint her own man in place of General Hamid Gul as the chief of the ISI, the military-intelligence agency that has armed and directed the mujahideen. Even then, General Gul carried on running Afghan policy from his new post as corps commander in Multan. He was able to do that because he had the support of the chief of staff, General Aslam Beg, another of Zia's cronies.

The retirement of General Beg last August marked the beginning of the end of the Zia vision for Afghanistan. The new army chief, General Asif Nawaz, wants to get on with a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan, partly to help improve relations with America (which cut aid to Pakistan in October 1990 because of Pakistan's growing nuclear capability). He also realises that without a settlement Afghanistan will never be

stable—and Pakistan will never get secure access to the newly independent republics of Central Asia.

General Nawaz has forced General Gul into retirement (by appointing him to run an ordnance factory, a job he considered to be beneath his dignity) and has warned General Assad Durrani, the present ISI chief, to halt covert aid to the mujahideen. "Islamic soldiers of vision cannot be tolerated any more," complained General Gul.

With the Pakistani military belatedly behind it, the UN peace plan now has a chance of success. The UN is hoping to arrange a meeting in Geneva, perhaps by the end of February, of the various Afghan parties—the Kabul government, the mujahideen, tribal chiefs and representatives of the former king, Zahir Shah—to co-opt an interim government. Getting them to Geneva will be the easy bit. Even the moderate mujahideen reject any interim role for President Najibullah (although they seem ready to accept "good Muslims" from his government). But Mr Najibullah, with support from the Central Asian republics, which do not want to see an Islamic republic in Afghanistan, may refuse to step aside.

One other, deeper, pitfall is the attitude of the trio of radical mujahideen groups which reject the UN plan altogether (one of their leaders, Rasul Sayyaf, calls it "an international conspiracy against Islam"). They have protested bitterly at the shift in Pakistan's policy, and can be relied upon to use threats and violence to try to stop the moderates attending peace talks. But they depend on sanctuary inside Pakistan, which also controls the main flow of supplies to their followers. Stripped of the ISI's support, it seems unlikely that the radicals can hold up the peace process for long.

support from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Saudi government, angry at the support some mujaheddin gave to Saddam Hussein in the Gulf war, has trimmed its aid, but private Saudi money still arrives. Pakistan says it supports the UN plan, and has even threatened to expel Afghan groups who oppose it, but the Pakistani armed forces (whose intelligence service, the ISI, has directed the mujaheddin since 1980) still want a military solution to produce a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul.

Virtually abandoned by Russia, which is anxious to win freedom for 70 or so of its soldiers still held by the mujaheddin, President Najibullah has approached India and China for arms. More important, however, is his effort to cultivate the newly independent Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union—especially Turkmenia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, all of which have ethnic ties to Afghanistan itself.

The abortive coup against Mikhail Gorbachev last August seemed at first to be good for the UN peace plan, but bad for Mr Najibullah personally. Soon after the attempted coup, the Soviet Union appeared to give the plan a boost by dropping its demand that Mr Najibullah should take part in it. But the subsequent break-up of the Soviet Union has helped the Afghan leader. The Central Asian republics are run by men similar to himself: communists-turned-nationalists who will tolerate state-controlled Islam but who hate the idea of a radical Islamic government in Kabul as much as Mr Najibullah does. They may not provide him with arms. But they have supplied much of the 900,000 tonnes of fuel and 500,000 tonnes of wheat that Afghanistan needs to import to get through the winter.

There is, however, a complication for Mr Najibullah. While the Central Asian republics will oppose a fundamentalist regime in Kabul of the kind favoured by Pakistan's army, they will also champion the rights of the Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik minorities in any post-war settlement. These minorities, and others such as the Hazaras and the

Baluchis, traditionally ceded political control to the majority Pathans. But 12 years of civil war have made them more assertive. Ahmed Shah Masood, a celebrated mujaheddin commander, has carved out a small Tajik state in the northeast; he would resist ceding authority to Kabul. A settlement that ignores such factors will lead only to ethnic conflict.

Meanwhile, despite the rockets, morale in Kabul has risen. Though prices are high, the bazaars are well stocked: fruit comes from Pakistan, televisions from South Korea, and army-surplus jackets from the ex-Soviet Union. Government shops are managing to keep soldiers and state employees warm, well fed and relatively comfortable. With a military stalemate that favours the defender, and a clutch of new friends on the northern borders, President Najibullah may feel more secure than at any time since before the Soviet army's departure from Afghanistan in February 1989.

## Asymmetric

THE ECONOMIST FEBRUARY 1ST 1992

FROM A CORRESPONDENT IN KABUL

WHILE rocket salvos from the mujaheddin still occasionally splatter Afghanistan's capital, most of the country is wrapped in unaccustomed calm. This owes much to the winter snows, which make campaigning difficult, a little to the support of most mujaheddin for a peace settlement, and nothing at all to "negative symmetry", the much-vaunted agreement under which America and the Soviet Union stopped sending guns to the rival Afghan factions from January 1st.

Neither army nor mujaheddin are short of arms: their stockpiles could keep the war going for years. Moreover, both are confident that any gaps in their armouries would be filled by other friendly countries.

The radical mujaheddin, who reject the United Nations' peace plan for a ceasefire, a broad-based interim government and democratic elections, are counting on continued

# The royal card

By Salamati Ali in Islamabad

A consensus is emerging among the major foreign powers involved in the Afghan conflict — the US, Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan — that the exiled Afghan king Zahir Shah should return to the country and head an interim regime. As if on cue, President Najibullah's Kabul government has restored the citizenship of the ex-monarch and his family who have been living in Rome.

The return of Zahir Shah, however, still remains controversial not only among his own compatriots but also in Pakistan, whose government is yet to voice its open support to the move. Afghans opposed to his stewardship argue that he played no part in the 13-year war and thereby snapped all ties with his former kingdom. Pakistan's ruling establishment — the president, the army and the civilian government — is known to be divided on open backing for the ex-monarch.

But recent developments indicate the willingness of the Pakistani army — the most decisive force in the country — to deal with Zahir Shah. Early this month, army chief Gen. Asif Nawaz Janjua stopped over in Rome on his way to the US. This led to reports of his meeting with Zahir Shah, which the general promptly denied. But Wali Khan, the son-in-law and spokesman of the ex-king, disclosed that he had met the general in Rome.

The rebel mujahideen camp brought the Rome contact into sharp focus with a disclosure of its own. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar — head of Hizbe Islami, the most powerful mujahideen group — said that Janjua had told him two months ago of the willingness of all involved foreign powers, the Kabul regime and some mujahideen groups to back Zahir Shah to head the Afghan interim regime, which will hold free elections in the country.

Hekmatyar's statement was made inside Afghanistan to visiting Pakistani journalists and has not been contradicted by Pakistani officials. He also declared that the ex-king's return would intensify the conflict in Afghanistan.

According to Hekmatyar, it was Pakistan's Foreign Ministry during the late president Zia-ul-Haq's era that initiated a role for Zahir Shah, but it was vetoed by the powerful directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence. The plan was revived in 1989-90 when Benazir Bhutto was the prime minister. At a meeting with the mujahideen, Bhutto and her aides used Palestine Liberation Organisation supremo Yasser Arafat to persuade the Afghan rebels to form a coalition with the Kabul regime with Zahir Shah as the head. But then Pakistani army chief, Mirza Aslam Beg, intervened to force Bhutto to drop the plan. Hekmatyar said Beg's successor, Janjua, renewed the plan two months ago after the foreign powers came around to a consensus.

Hekmatyar's appeal to Pakistanis to re-

sist their government's involvement in what he calls an international conspiracy against the Afghans has evoked some response. Pakistan's fundamentalist party, Jamaat-e-Islami, the second largest component of the coalition government, has declared its unequivocal opposition to Zahir Shah. Also siding with Hekmatyar are the Afghan rebels led by Abdul Rasool Sayyaf and Yunus Khalis and some groups of the Shia sect.

However, this still leaves the majority of mujahideen supporting the ex-king as the only alternative to further chaos in the country. The REVIEW has learned that a number of guerrilla commanders inside Afghanistan would defect from their Pakistan-based leaders and join pro-Zahir Shah forces.


Also arrayed against the hawkish line of Hekmatyar are Afghanistan's northern neighbours, the newly independent Muslim republics of Central Asia, which want to forge closer economic ties with Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. The economic linkages cannot develop meaningfully until the conflict in Afghanistan is resolved. Moreover, the Central Asian leaders have little sympathy for the radical brand of Islam as they are also coping with domestic fundamentalist elements.

On the other hand, Islamabad takes Hekmatyar seriously because of his group's proven fighting abilities. Hekmatyar has also built close ties all across the Middle East among fundamentalist groups opposed to the West.


International pressures and Pakistan's own long-term interests in building close economic ties with Iran, Turkey and Central Asia could yet goad Islamabad to openly back Zahir Shah and bring about a swift solution to the Afghan conflict. In the event, devoid of Pakistan's hinterland support, Hekmatyar's Hizbe Islami and other hardline groups could still fight on in Afghanistan — but as mere isolated and outlawed bands.

## IRC Mourns Tragic Death of Afghan Staff Member

On November 25th, while enroute to work, Engineer Aziz Ahmed Osmani was assassinated by an unknown assailant. Engineer Aziz joined the IRC in 1985, after having escaped from Afghanistan a year earlier. He was promoted to the position of Coordinator in 1989, overseeing five English, Pushto and Dari language and administrative-training programs staffed by 125 Afghan teachers and serving 10,000 students. IRC's worldwide staff, many of whom had worked with Engineer Aziz in Pakistan, are deeply saddened at the loss of a close colleague and friend.



Engineer Aziz leaves behind a wife and five children. A special fund has been established by IRC staff in his memory to help provide for his widow and children.



Int'l Rescue Committee  
Field Reports  
Winter/Spring 1992

1/12 - Frontier Post



# Deliberate Contradictions

By Khawar Malik

**A**lthough national and international media has generally chosen to highlight only the 'conforming' bits of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's statement on Afghanistan (January 31), discerning observers maintain that it did not exactly conform with the 'shift in policy' statement of January 28 by the minister for state for foreign affairs, Mr Siddique Kanju. It would be instructive to present the differences in the two views within the Pakistani establishment.

While comparing the two statements, one is struck by the fact that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan emphasised a great deal that there was 'absolutely no shift' in the Afghan policy. Rather, he was at pains to explain that 'it is consistent with our stand of many months' in which 'we have already welcomed the UN peace plan' and 'always emphasised upon a political solution'. His sardonic 'where do you see the shift' contrasts starkly with Mr Kanju's categorical 'there is now a complete shift in the policy' and 'we had only welcomed the UN peace plan earlier but now we intend to get it implemented'.

Even more important than these 'little verbal discrepancies' are the contradictory stands of the two representatives of establishment on crux issues. 'The minister for foreign affairs rejected the Mujahideen totally by saying 'UN peace plan cannot be held hostage for a few now' and that 'we have waited for mujahideen to reach a consensus. We will not wait now'. The president, on the other hand, said that 'we are making our best efforts for making our Afghan brothers agree to this and they also agree that there should be a political solution'.

Another clear incongruity between their respective stands is on the issue of the inclusion of Zahir Shah and Najibullah. Mr Kanju, when questioned on King Zahir Shah's presence in the representative assembly (or the Loya Jirga), said that 'it is up to UN to consult and invite him'. On Najibullah or his representatives, however, the minister added a condition of 'after consultations with all the other parties' to this 'blank cheque'. The President, on the other hand, recalled in his statement that one of the three points clearly spelt out in the Secretary General's report to the UN last year was that 'there would be no controversial personalities in the interim arrangement'.

The proponents of 'Ishaq unhappy with new policy' theory also present reports in the international media that the president was conspicuously absent from the January 25 meeting of the Afghan Cell, the very day when this elementary change in policy was debated and decided upon. That is

highly unusual. Unprecedented too, because I can recall at least two occasions in the past when the previously scheduled meetings of the Cell were cancelled due to his unavailability although other members (including prime minister, COAS, minister for foreign affairs and Director General etc) were all available' a source from Islamabad disclosed.

The advocates of the theory have a ready-made answer to the disturbing question that arises quite naturally. How was the new change in policy affected if president Ghulam Ishaq Khan, generally regarded as the 'other custodian' of the country's Afghan policy, was not in agreement with it? 'Obviously, the first player changed tack after his visit abroad where certain things were decided and agreed upon. And the junior most member of the troika is supporting him rather than the president'.

A jubilant PPP leader told this scribe: 'The new change in policy is a victory of the PPP which had jovoured and pursued 'the political solution' during its tenure. General Nasirullah Baber, the man who created the Afghan resistance in 1974, has been instrumental even in this. He not only arranged the recent meeting between the COAS and Zahir Shah's son-in-law in Rome (he was also present in the meeting himself) but was also instrumental in arranging the meeting between the head of a sensitive intelligence agency with Najibullah in Kabul. It is, indeed, sweet revenge that we should checkmate the man who has been responsible for the fall of both of our governments'.

There are others, however, who give less currency to the theory of 'the deal abroad', or at least, attribute President's present retreat on the Afghan issue to a let down by Mujahideen. 'The mujahideen have been divided, selfish and indifferent to the interests of their hosts. They have let down the Pakistan government on two important occasions, during their combined visit to Moscow for dialogue and on the return visit of Russian envoy, Alexander Rutskoi to Pakistan for repatriation of Soviet POWs. Both times, they created ill-will in Russia for Pakistan, their host for 12 years, when it was hoping for a breakthrough in relations with the leadership of the new Soviet republics. Also, with no mujahideen unity in sight, the establishment had to acquiesce to the pressure from abroad'.

It may be mentioned here that president himself has made hectic efforts for unity of mujahideen. On December 3, before the establishment declared its intent to implement the UN peace proposal, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Sibghatullah Mujadadi, Pir Ahmad Shah Gillani, Mohd Nabi Muhammad, and two representatives of two shia factions, Qazi Amin and Ayotullah Mohsini, were reportedly called to

the Presidency and asked to sign an accord proposing formation of a council of 100 representatives to hold election within a year and give way for the elected government. The absentees from the meeting included Professor Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and Mouli Younis Khalis although Professor Sayyaf did send a nominee, Engineer Masud, as an observer.

The accord was signed but did not see the black light of the print as the developments overtook it. Efforts, however, are still underway to gather various factions of mujahideen on a common platform and the live-wire Jamaat Amir, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, is making concerted efforts for it. Since Jan 18 Qazi Sahib has been busy holding meetings with various mujahideen leaders and both president and prime minister. The Jamaat sources indicate that 'Qazi Sahib has had a good measure of success as leaders of the four major parties, that is Hekmatyar (Hizbe Islami), Rabbani (Jamaat Islami), Sayyaf (Ittehad Islami) and Khalis (Hizbe Islami K) have agreed to a formula envisaging interim Islamic government headed by a man having no leadership role to play in future, a cease-fire, repatriation of refugees and elections, in that order.

Although the agreement does not include three out of seven group leaders based in Pakistan (Mujadadi, Gillani, Nabi Muhammad) and Qazi Hussain Ahmad's mission has been severely criticised by the AIG chief Sibghatullah Mujadadi as 'shameful intervention in Afghan's affairs', the Jamaat is not worried. 'Small fries like Mujadadi are controlled by the government and do not matter. Once the big four get together on a formula, they will be forced to follow suit'.

The Jamaat has also indicated that the Qazi mission has the tacit support of both president and prime minister who seem to hold that if mujahideen could agree on something, the UN peace proposal could be reworked. Another recent incident that they regard as an important development in this regard is the recent negotiations between UN Secretary General's special envoy Benen Sevan and Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani on February 3. Mr Sevan is reported to have told Rabbani 'we are not really sure ourselves and would welcome proposals from you'.

There are some others who agree with Jamaat that if the Mujahideen could develop a consensus somehow, things might change. Still others hold the view that the mujahideen can upset the UN appeacart by producing another 'Tana'i in Kabul. 'A collapse in Kabul at this stage could change everything and I suspect that in the next month and a half, Pakistani establishment would seriously allow the mujahideen to make one last ditch effort for it. I am convinced that president's isolation on the Afghan issue is actually a hoax. His separate furrow is



Con't on p. 19

2/7  
Frontier Post

actually a tactically agreed upon method among the troika to fool the world till such a thing happens.

# Unblocking the Crossroads



Long-dormant relationships are being rapidly awakened in Central Asia. Plucky Afghan traders are flocking to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. At higher levels, Pakistan

has extended more than \$60 million in credit to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Turkey has Washington's backing as it forges a new leadership role among its cultural cousins. On a swing through Central Asia last week, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker told his hosts that Washington wanted them to take the democratic, free-market road. Like Pakistan and Iran, America is a source of much-needed investment.

Even as Baker toured, Iran was pushing for an Islamic common market based on the Economic Cooperation Organisation. Set up by Pakistan, Turkey and Iran 27 years ago, the ECO held its first summit Feb. 16 in Tehran. New members: the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan is expected to join soon. Traffic on Central Asia's ancient trade routes is shifting into higher gear.

The big question mark in all this is Afghanistan. "Afghanistan is now bound to be central in affairs in that part of the world, instead of a peripheral player," says an Indian Foreign Ministry official. "The Central Asian republics are bound to prefer Pakistan over Iran as their gateway to a warm-water port. This makes passage through Afghanistan essential." To the Central Asian states, peace in Afghanistan goes hand in hand with regional stability and prosperity. And the winds of change are blowing across Afghanistan. After fourteen years of civil war, says United Nations envoy Benon Sevan, the prospects for peace are "better than ever before."

Supporting that hope is a new-found pragmatism in Islamabad. Long a key backer of the armed mujahideen resistance, Pakistan resisted a political solution that would include Afghan President Najibullah — until last month. The shift was apparently prompted by the need to open trade routes through Afghanistan to the Central Asian republics. On his part, Najibullah has extended Islamabad an offer it

cannot afford to refuse.

"Instead of military rivalry, we should turn to economic partnership," he told Asiaweek in an interview. "Afghanistan could be a bridge for Pakistan to markets in Central Asian republics. It could become a highway for transit and trade."

The first sign of the Pakistani thaw was the forced retirement last month of Lt.-Gen. Hamid Gul. Former head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, Gul was the mujahideen's most powerful backer in the military establishment. Pakistan is also concerned about the 4 million Afghan refugees on its soil. Funds for their upkeep are drying up, and U.N. officials admit that "donor fatigue is acute." Peace in Afghanistan would mean they could be sent home. The U.N. plan seeks to convene an all-party Afghan assembly that would form a provisional government and hold elections. Negotiations would be held in a neutral country, possibly Switzerland or Turkey.

While Pakistan has backed the peace plan, the mujahideen have not. Powerful resistance leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has vowed to continue the war until there is an Islamic administration in Kabul. Under the U.N. plan a *loya jirga*, or grand assembly, would decide what form the interim government would take. But fundamentalists fear that it would be made up of tribal elders who would bring back

ousted King Zahir Shah, 77. Pakistan has also attached conditions to its cooperation. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan has said there should be no "controversial" figures in the body. His comment was seen as a reference to Najibullah. Meanwhile, the flow of arms to the guerrillas has not been stopped. "We have not seen any decrease in Pakistan's assistance," Afghan Defence Minister Aslam Watanjar told Asiaweek.

But Islamabad's minister of state for foreign affairs, Mohamed Siddique Kanju, has hinted that Pakistan would go ahead with the U.N. peace plan despite the objections of the fundamentalists. "We cannot let a few people hold the Afghan peace process hostage," he said. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, whom many observers credit with the change in policy towards Afghanistan, says "it is all up to the U.N. and the Afghans now." Sums up Akram Zaki, Pakistan's secretary-general at the foreign office: "The caravan will go on. Those who do not join will be left behind." Washington has backed the U.N. plan. So have the Russians.

Afghanistan watcher Fazal-ur Rehman of Islamabad's Institute of Strategic Studies warns that if the U.N. plan does not get underway quickly, Afghanistan is likely to face severe fragmentation. Says he: "The local commanders are running the administration now. If they are allowed to do so for several more years, it will become impossible to bring in centralised control, as these commanders will not give up their powers." Such an unstable Afghanistan, says Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shaharyar

WHEN LAST SEEN, JIM BAKER WAS FÊTED BY OUR NEW FRIENDS IN TAZWAKISTAN



Asbury Park Press Saturday, February 22, 1992

The Christian Science Monitor  
Los Angeles Times Syndicate

# AFGHANISTAN FORUM



## CONTENTS

**VOL. XX**

March 1992

**NO. 2**

Events.....	1- 2
Chronology.....	3- 5
Clippings.....	6-19
Louis Dupree's Afghanistan.....	20-24
Food.....	24
Doctoral Dissertations.....	25-26
Recent Publications.....	26-27
Book Reviews.....	28-32
People.....	32-34
Items from <u>The Kabul Times</u> .....	35-40

**AFGHANISTAN FORUM, INC.  
201 EAST 71<sup>ST</sup> STREET, 2K  
NEW YORK, NY 10021**



#### ABBREVIATIONS USED

ACBAR	- Agency Coordinating Bureau for Afghan Relief
ATG	- Afghan Interim Government
BIA	- Bakhtar Information Agency
CC	- Central Committee
CSM	- Christian Science Monitor
DYOA	- Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan
FRG	- Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	- German Democratic Republic
ICRC	- Int'l Committee of the Red Cross
KT	- Kabul Times
LAT	- Los Angeles Times
NGO	- Non-Governmental Organization
NWFP	- Northwest Frontier Province
NYT	- New York Times
OIC	- Organization of Islamic Conference
PCV	- Peace Corps Volunteer
PDPA	- People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PT	- Pakistan Times
PVO	- Private Voluntary Organization
RC	- Revolutionary Council
RA	- Republic of Afghanistan
SCMP	- South China Morning Post
UNGA	- United Nations General Assembly
UNOCA	- United Nations Office of the Commissioner for Afghanistan
UNHCR	- United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WSJ	- Wall Street Journal

Line drawings from the 1982 Afghanistan Calendar of the Chicago Afghanistan Relief Committee.

Please send items for the AFGHANISTAN FORUM to  
The Afghanistan Forum, Inc.  
201 East 71st Street, 2K  
New York, NY 10021, USA

The opinions expressed in the FORUM are those of the parties & publications involved and are not necessarily those of the Afghanistan FORUM. Listing of organizations does not necessarily imply endorsement.

Mary Ann Siegfried  
Editor & typist

Leonard Oppenheim  
Treasurer &  
proofreader

Subscription rates: \$25 per year (US & Canada) (Add \$5 for FORUM PAPERS)  
6 issues/year \$25 per year (foreign); airmail Europe - \$35; Asia \$40.  
\$35 per year (institutions) \$45; \$50.  
(includes FORUM PAPERS)

ISSN 0889-2148